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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is half a decade into developing a jurisprudence
applying the Second Amendment.  If the jurisprudential balance of the
Supreme Court shifts by a single vote, then it is distinctly possible
that the Second Amendment could be effectively erased from the Con-
stitution, as the Court could overrule the two foundational cases cur-
rently on the books or confine them to their facts.  But assuming the
Second Amendment survives these perils, the next quarter-century
will likely see a series of Second Amendment cases develop a meaning-
ful and consequential jurisprudence regarding a constitutional provi-
sion exercised daily by millions of Americans.
This would parallel the jurisprudence governing the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.  That provision was barely developed
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before the Supreme Court held in 1919 that inciting imminent law-
lessness is not protected by the First Amendment.1  The number of
free speech cases proliferated once the Court incorporated that right
into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause in 1925.2  The
right to bear arms is poised to follow the same track.
As well it should.  Americans only exercise many of their constitu-
tional rights if they are suspected of running afoul of the law.  How-
ever, since mere possession of a firearm is an exercise of the right to
bear arms, Second Amendment rights are exercised daily by tens of
millions of Americans, as are First Amendment rights.  Parallels be-
tween free speech and gun rights suggest a common doctrinal frame-
work could govern both.
An estimated 70 million or more Americans possess 310 million
firearms,3 regulated by as many as 20,000 gun laws at the federal,
state, and local levels.4  This essentially creates infinite permutations
of fact patterns for judicial review of gun laws, determining whether a
given gun law is unconstitutional when applied to certain persons
under certain circumstances.  Yet only two Supreme Court cases—
both of recent vintage—currently provide direct guidance: District of
Columbia v. Heller,5 and McDonald v. Chicago.6  Courts are only now
beginning to grapple with the magnitude of the task of devising a
framework to govern such multitudinous possibilities.
There is a growing need for such a framework.  A federal appeals
court said in 2009 in one Second Amendment case what could be said
in most Second Amendment cases currently in the courts: “The gov-
ernment has approached this case as though all it had to do to defend
1. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  The Court subsequently refined
this rule on incitement. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam).
2. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
3. WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32842, GUN CONTROL LEGISLA-
TION 8 (2012), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/NTM9-PATN; see also Firearm
Fact Card 2011, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N INST. FOR LEGIS. ACTION (Jan. 20, 2011), http:/
/www.nraila.org/newsissues/fact-sheets/2011/firearm-fact-card-2011.aspx,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/Y884-TGCA (presenting Second Amendment is-
sues and various statistics about gun owners in the United States).  There is rea-
son to believe these numbers could be significantly higher. See Carl Bialik, Guns
Present Polling Conundrum, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2013, 11:30 PM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/numbers/guns-present-polling-conundrum-1223/, archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/BZ6Z-HWVG.
4. Gun-control advocates dispute this frequently-cited number, sometimes with
qualifiers such as the Brookings Institution saying that there are 300 laws that
are “major.” See JON S. VERNICK & LISA M. HEPBURN, THE BROOKINGS INST.,
TWENTY THOUSAND GUN CONTROL LAWS? 2 (2002), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/4WYL-RWTQ.  The number 300 seems low given the variety of statutes,
regulations, and ordinances, but this Article’s point remains regardless.
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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the constitutionality of [the gun-control law at issue] is invoke Heller’s
language about certain ‘presumptively lawful’ gun regulations . . . .
Not so.”7  By contrast, the Second Amendment may not be “singled out
for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment.”8  Nor does Heller
allow courts to apply uniformly some intermediate-scrutiny standard
that effectively defers to legislatures, giving significant weight to as-
sertions of personal liberty under the Second Amendment while also
giving government significant latitude to restrict that liberty.  Just as
the Court firmly rejected “a free-floating test for First Amendment
coverage . . . [utilizing] an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and
benefits,”9 so too the Court rejected Justice Stephen Breyer’s proposed
“interest-balancing” approach to Second Amendment cases.10
There is no need to reinvent the jurisprudential wheel.  Rather
than spending years devising a series of tests to reach correct judg-
ments in a rapidly building wave of Second Amendment litigation,
judges should recur to a framework that has served the Nation and
the law quite well for many years.  Although a universal theory to gov-
ern constitutional law continues to elude the judiciary and the acad-
emy, a common framework governing two commonly-exercised
constitutional liberties—conveniently situated in adjacent Amend-
ments—is philosophically attractive in moving incrementally toward
a coherent and consistent system of constitutional review.
The five-tiered framework of standards of review that governs the
First Amendment should also govern the Second Amendment.  Three
levels of scrutiny apply to speech on private land, depending on the
nature of the burden on speech, ranging from per se invalidity, to
strict scrutiny, to intermediate scrutiny.  Two additional levels of re-
strictions are constitutionally permissible on public land under the
public forum doctrine: one allows limitations to preserve the forum for
the purpose for which the public has access to the government prop-
erty, and in the case of a nonpublic forum, the test is mere
reasonableness.
Many in law school learn the adage, “Hard facts make bad law.”
This Article’s approach facilitates robust protections for law-abiding
Americans as they seek to own and carry common firearms in their
daily lives, while enabling government to address public-safety con-
cerns regarding dangerous persons, unusually-dangerous weapons,
and sensitive locations.  The federal courts of appeals for several cir-
cuits generally support this approach,11 as do several leading schol-
7. United States v. Skoien (Skoien I), 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en
banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
8. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 778–79.
9. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
10. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
11. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011).
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ars.12  Courts do not face a binary choice of upholding severe
restrictions on a person’s gun ownership in his own home or allowing
that same person to carry a machinegun into the White House.
Neither is acceptable, nor mandated by the Constitution.
Part II of this Article sets forth the current state of the law on the
Second Amendment.  Part III discusses the proposed approach for Sec-
ond Amendment judicial review, consisting of a three-step inquiry.
These three steps dictate which of five levels of scrutiny should apply
in any given case.  Part IV explores the rationale and normative prin-
ciples underlying this theory, including the desirable clarity of per se
rules and the need to restore strict scrutiny to a test that is suffi-
ciently strict to provide adequate protection for core exercises of fun-
damental rights.  Part IV also acknowledges three differences between
the First and Second Amendments that suggest areas on the margins
where the jurisprudence of the two Amendments might diverge.  Part
V expounds the three levels of scrutiny that apply to burdens on Sec-
ond Amendment exercises on private property.  Part VI explains how
public forum doctrine offers two additional standards of review that
apply on public property.  Finally, Part VII concludes with a discus-
sion on how courts should proceed regarding the Second Amendment.
II. THE SECOND AMENDMENT AFTER
HELLER AND MCDONALD
The federal judiciary has taken only the first steps in developing
Second Amendment jurisprudence by defining that provision’s scope
and contours.  The Supreme Court’s most recent case included a signal
that the entire concept of a private right to bear arms is only a single
vote away from being eradicated by the Court’s current member-
ship.13  But assuming the Supreme Court’s two recent decisions en-
dure, the next three decades will almost certainly see an array of
consequential cases in this energetically-contested area of law.
A. An Individual Right Applicable to the States
The Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008.
In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held the Second
Amendment secures the right of law-abiding and peaceable citizens to
12. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Second Amendment Standards of Review in a Heller
World, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1617, 1628–36 (2012) [hereinafter Lund, Standards
of Review]; Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the
Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2042–44 (2008); Eugene Volokh, Imple-
menting the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Frame-
work and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1454–72 (2009).
13. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 916 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should reconsider Heller); id. at 941 (insisting “the Framers did not write the
Second Amendment in order to protect a private right”).
434 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:429
own readily-usable firearms unconnected to any form of militia ser-
vice,14 resolving a three-way circuit split on the meaning of the
Amendment.15  The Court reached its conclusion by examining the
original meaning of the Second Amendment’s text, though some schol-
ars find Justice Scalia’s opinion wanting as an exemplar of original-
ism.16  As Judge Laurence Silberman wrote for the D.C. Circuit, to
determine precisely what is protected by the Second Amendment,
courts “look to the lawful, private purposes for which people of the
[Framers’] time owned and used arms.”17  Such purposes include
hunting and self-defense.18
The Court also explained the relationship between the two clauses
in the Amendment.  The first is a prefatory clause that announced the
civic purpose of the right, which can resolve ambiguities regarding the
right, but not constrain the following operative clause of the Amend-
ment.19  Additionally, “the ‘militia’ in colonial America consisted of a
subset of ‘the people,’”20 while “the people” seemingly “refers to a class
of persons who are part of a national community or who have other-
wise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community.”21  And “state” refers to any polity22—in this
case, the American nation.  The Court held that the Federal City’s cat-
egorical ban on handgun ownership violated the individual right to
bear arms, and invalidated the D.C. gun ban.23
Two years later, Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the Court in Mc-
Donald, holding the Second Amendment is a fundamental right, appli-
cable to state and local governments through the Fourteenth
14. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–95 (2008).
15. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Armed By Right: The Emerging Jurisprudence of the Sec-
ond Amendment, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 167, 174–76 (2008).
16. E.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurispru-
dence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2009) [hereinafter Lund, Originalist].
17. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
18. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 251–54, 268 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing
various sources).  The latter of these interests, self-defense, is ancillary to the
natural right of self-preservation. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *136, *139–40 (1765); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T.
Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE L.J. 995, 1003–04 (1995) (book
review).
19. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576–78.
20. Id. at 580.
21. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
22. Heller, 554 U.S. at 597 (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TUTION § 208 (1833)); see generally Eugene Volokh, Necessary to the Security of a
Free State, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that, for the purposes of
interpreting the term “free state” in the Second Amendment, in the Framers’
time “free state” was a political term of art meaning “free country,” or the oppo-
site of a despotism).
23. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36.
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Amendment under the Court’s incorporation doctrine.24  Four Justices
concluded the right to bear arms was incorporated into the Due Pro-
cess Clause,25 while Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately that
the right to bear arms was applicable to the States through the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause.26
But the five-Justice majority agreed that “[a] clear majority of the
States in 1868 . . . recognized the right to keep and bear arms as being
among the foundational rights necessary to our system of Govern-
ment.”27  Justice Alito wrote for the Court, concluding that the Second
Amendment “right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradi-
tion,’”28 characterizing Blackstone as asserting in 1765 that the right
to arms was regarded as “one of the fundamental rights of English-
men.”29  He cited to Heller’s rationale that the right was to create a
bulwark against a tyrannical regime imposing its will through mili-
tary might to intimidate the people, and surveyed various scholarly
works to show that facilitating a latent counter-threat of popular
armed resistance “was fundamental to the newly formed system of
government.”30
24. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 767–78 (2010).
25. Id. at 780–85, 791 (plurality opinion of Alito, J.).
26. Id. at 805–13 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  In
doing so, Justice Thomas agreed that the right is “fundamental” to an “American
scheme of liberty” and “deeply rooted” in America’s history and tradition. Id. at
806.  But he takes the position that it applies to the States because it is among
the “privileges or immunities” of American citizens through that clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.  Justice Thomas’ opinion is the one consistent with
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kenneth A. Klukowski,
Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 197, 234–52 (2009).
27. McDonald, 561 U.S.at 777, see Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual
Rights Under State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified
in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87
TEX. L. REV. 7, 11–17, 50–54 (2008); see generally Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal
Security, Personal Liberty, and “The Constitutional Right to Bear Arms”: Visions
of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 341
(1995) (tracing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and analyzing the
relationship between the Amendment and the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, focusing
on the right to keep and bear arms).
28. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721
(1997)).
29. Id. at 768 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008) (citing
in turn 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *136, *139–40)).  Scholarly treatises con-
temporaneous with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise referred
to the right to bear arms as fundamental. E.g., TIMOTHY FARRAR, MANUAL OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 118 (1867).
30. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 769. (citing, inter alia, 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 360, 362–63 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds.
1995) (collecting sources); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND
AMENDMENT 171–278 (2008)).
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Unfortunately, the majority opinions in both cases are marred by
dicta,31 which could create problems in the lower courts.  All federal
appellate courts afford considerable weight to Supreme Court dicta,32
and, as such, this dicta often proves controlling. Heller’s dictum says
the Court is not “cast[ing] doubt” on certain “longstanding prohibi-
tions” regarding felons, the mentally ill, firearms in “sensitive places,”
and limitations on firearms commerce.33  The Court designates all of
these as “presumptively lawful” and adds that this list is not exhaus-
tive.34  This ipse dixit is devoid of textual and historical support, en-
tails premises not grounded in the Constitution, and may sow
confusion among the lower courts.35  As Professor Lund says, some
speculate this was the price Justice Scalia had to pay to garner five
votes for his opinion, but such auguring is best left to others.36  What
is clear—by contrast—is that the same five Justices reaffirmed this
dictum in McDonald, writing, “We repeat those assurances here.”37
Lund opines, “This repetition of Heller’s ‘assurances’ is unnecessary
and irresponsible. . . .  Their reappearance in Alito’s McDonald opin-
ion is the single largest obstacle to regarding that opinion as a sound
model of judicial restraint.”38
Despite their imperfections, Heller and McDonald are valuable for
reasons beyond the fact that their holdings are correct.  In terms of
fundamental constitutional principles, for example, these decisions
were important for limited government by declaring that an individ-
ual right to bear arms is necessary to the security of a free republic.
“The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distin-
guished from technical meaning.”39  Theories that would deny an indi-
31. The courts of appeals are split on whether this language is actually dicta.  Some
recognize that it is. See, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th
Cir. 2010); United States v. McCrane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009)
(Tymkovich, J., concurring).  Others wrongly conclude it is not dicta.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).  Others note this disagreement
without deciding. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 90 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2010).
32. See, e.g., Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004);
McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 369 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2004);
Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d
718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003); United States v. City of Hialeah, 140 F.3d 968, 974
(11th Cir. 1998); Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994).
33. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
34. Id. at 627 n.26.
35. See Lund, Originalist, supra note 16, at 1356–68.
36. See id. at 1345.
37. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
38. Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There More?) in McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487, 502 (2011).
39. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931).
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vidual right accordingly do violence to the plain meaning of the words
in the Second Amendment, and to the rules of grammar and syntax
that prevailed in 1791.  By rejecting such a tortured interpretation of
the Amendment’s words, the Justices in the majority reinforced a car-
dinal principle that goes to the heart of why America has a written
Constitution at all—to delimit the powers of government in the lives
of the American people.
The collective-right theories rejected by the Supreme Court in both
cases were based on fanciful thinking that denied the simple reality—
embraced in Heller and McDonald—that the right to keep and bear
arms is premised on a fundamental mistrust of government’s ability to
protect its citizens, and also a mistrust of governmental benevolence—
that the American people as a whole might one day need to protect
their liberty against their own government.  Such premises are repug-
nant to many with a romantic view of human nature and great faith in
government.  But it is manifestly clear that those were the beliefs of
the Framers.
B. Myriad Questions Remain
The Heller Court made clear it was prudently not purporting to
“undertake an exhaustive historical analysis . . . of the full scope of the
Second Amendment.”40  Many questions remain regarding the reach,
limits, contours, specifics, and purpose of the right to keep and bear
arms.  Such questions will likely occupy the judiciary and the academy
for decades.  Perhaps the most unavoidable question is whether the
right to bear arms extends beyond the home. Heller and McDonald
both involved plaintiffs who wanted handguns in their privately-
owned homes for self-defense,41 but the Supreme Court’s reasoning
strongly implies that the right to bear arms also extends beyond the
home.42  These decisions led both the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Cir-
cuit to hold that the Second Amendment extends outside the home in
opinions by Judges Richard Posner43 and Diarmuid O’Scannlain,44 re-
spectively.  Two circuits have assumed so without holding.45
Another important question is whether the right to bear arms in-
cludes the right to carry concealed weapons.  The Supreme Court
quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes as saying, “There has been a great dif-
40. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
41. Id. at 573; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750.
42. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
43. Id. at 937.
44. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014).
45. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712
F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013).
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ference of opinion on the question.”46  On one hand, the Supreme
Court stated in dictum that the Second Amendment right does not
include the right to carry arms concealed.47  As early examples, in
1840 both the Tennessee and Alabama Supreme Courts held that car-
rying concealed weapons is outside the scope of the right to bear arms
in their States,48 as did the high courts in Georgia and Louisiana exer-
cising concurrent jurisdiction to interpret the Second Amendment
soon thereafter.49  Recently, the Seventh Circuit agreed that “a state
may be able to require ‘open carry’—that is, require persons who carry
a gun in public to carry it in plain view rather than concealed.”50
On the other hand, the Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated a ban
on concealed carrying for violating its state constitution’s right to bear
arms.51  The Ninth Circuit found this case of significant probative
value,52 approvingly quoting Nelson Lund, who wrote the Kentucky
case is “especially significant both because it is nearest in time to the
founding era and because the state court assumed (just as [Heller]
does), that the constitutional provision . . . codified a preexisting
right.”53  While Judge O’Scannlain has provided the most helpful ex-
ploration to date,54 the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in.
Another series of questions for which we do not have answers as
yet asks what weapons are encompassed by the right to bear arms.
What types of firearms, if any, are not protected by the Second
Amendment, and why?  What other sorts of projectile weapons are se-
cured by the Amendment, whether ancient (such as bows or cross-
bows) or modern (such as rocket propelled grenades or mortars)?  How
about non-projectile weapons?  Or nonlethal weapons?55  What about
edged weapons?  Does the Second Amendment’s orbit encircle knives?
If so, would this also extend to swords?  While the courts might go
many years before anyone will claim the right to carry a spear, judges
46. Heller, 554 U.S. at 618 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
*340 n.2 (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873)).
47. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897).
48. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, 158 (1840); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 614–16
(1840).
49. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846); State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490
(1850).  These were before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868.
50. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 938 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see also
James Bishop, Note, Hidden or on the Hip: The Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 907, 920–21 (2012) (“If concealed carry and open carry are in
fact equal alternative outlets for the same indivisible right, then a state can ban
or burden one so long as it allows the other.”).
51. See Bliss v. Commonwealth, 2 Litt. 90, 90 (Ky. 1822).
52. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1156 (9th Cir. 2014).
53. Id. (quoting Lund, Originalist, supra note 16, at 1360).
54. See id. at 1156–66.
55. See generally Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1387 (2009) (criticizing the argument that only those arms in exis-
tence in the Eighteenth Century are protected by the Second Amendment).
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could quickly confront cases involving switchblades or jackknifes.  As
a matter of original meaning, at least certain types of blades are
“arms” within the meaning of the Second Amendment.56
Still more questions involve persons prohibited from possessing
arms.  Several courts have upheld the federal statutory prohibition on
convicted felons possessing firearms,57 and no court of appeals to date
has invalidated that provision.  Regarding barring felons from owning
firearms, “Congress sought to rule broadly—to keep guns out of the
hands of those who have demonstrated that ‘they may not be trusted
to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.’”58  Violent
felons fit this bill, but what about white-collar felons?59
Despite the concerns that rightly attend behavioral abnormalities,
would the statutory prohibition on substance abusers owning fire-
arms60 survive meaningful judicial review?  Congress intended “to
keep firearms out of the possession of drug abusers” because they are
undeniably “a dangerous class of individuals.”61  But some young peo-
ple who get caught up in self-destructive habits turn their lives
around.  At minimum, courts must carefully draw distinction between
former users versus “abusers” regarding fundamental rights.
Still other questions concern whether the government can require
licenses or permits, and if so, with what conditions.  Licensing
schemes are widespread for various firearm-related matters, and it
will be interesting to see how the judiciary grapples with the emerging
challenges to these requirements, hopefully providing more than a
rubber-stamp.
Answering these questions requires courts to apply standards of
review and levels of scrutiny to laws that burden the right to bear
arms.  Regarding the dicta in Heller already discussed in section II.A,
Judge Diane Sykes observes that “it is not entirely clear whether this
56. Cockrum v. State, 24 Tex. 394, 403 (1859); see also David B. Kopel, Clayton E.
Cramer & Joseph Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 MICH. J. L. RE-
FORM 167 (2013) (arguing that under the Supreme Court’s standard in Heller,
knives are “arms” and should be protected by the Second Amendment because
they are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, including
self-defense).
57. E.g., United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Anderson, 559
F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009).  This prohibition is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012).
58. Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 CONG. REC.
14,773 (daily ed. May 23, 1968) (statement of Sen. Long)).
59. See generally C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695 (2009) (arguing that stripping an individual of his
right to keep and bear arms due to a felony conviction is constitutionally dubious
unless the individual was convicted of a crime of violence).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) (2012).
61. United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 280 (3d Cir. 2010).
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language should be taken to suggest that the listed firearms regula-
tions are presumed to fall outside the scope of the Second Amend-
ment . . . or that they are presumptively lawful under even the highest
standard of scrutiny applicable to laws that encumber constitutional
rights.”62  This is only one of many questions pertaining to the level(s)
of scrutiny courts should apply in Second Amendment cases.  It is to
those questions we now turn.
III. RATIONALE AND LIMITS OF APPLYING THIS
FRAMEWORK TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The First Amendment framework is eminently useful in resolving
Second Amendment issues.  As already discussed in Part II, several
courts—including the Supreme Court—have signaled support for this
approach.  But even more important is why judges have so quickly
moved in this direction, a reason that would compel this Article’s ar-
gument even without judicial support.
The multiple tiers of scrutiny for the Free Speech Clause of the
First Amendment have little to do with the unique characteristics of
speech.  Rather, it is a conceptual approach to navigate the line-draw-
ing problems arising from the widespread exercise of a fundamental
right in a free society.  It just so happens that both free speech and the
right to bear arms fit that description.
Many fundamental rights—and most enumerated rights, whether
fundamental or not—are never used by most Americans; they are only
triggered when the coercive organs of government (e.g., law enforce-
ment personnel and criminal prosecutors) exert power against a per-
son.  If the police never search a person or his home, then he never
asserts his Fourth Amendment rights.  If he is never criminally prose-
cuted, then he never exercises most of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.  If he is never detained in jail or criminally sentenced, then he
never uses his Eighth Amendment rights.
By contrast, the First and Second Amendments are exercised by
many millions of Americans daily.  People exercise free speech rights
with many of the words they express on almost any subject matter.
And the mere act of owning a firearm is an exercise of the Second
Amendment, meaning almost 100 million Americans exercise that
right continually.63
For both rights, picture a series of five concentric circles.  The in-
nermost is the indispensable center of the right, violations of which
are per se invalid.  The second circle encompasses direct burdens on
the right that do not inherently violate the indispensable core.  The
62. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010).
63. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
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third circle is further removed from the center point, encompassing
incidental burdens on the right.  The outer two circles only tangen-
tially burden the right.  A person slips to the fourth level only when
venturing upon publicly-owned spaces that are not traditional forums,
where the individual’s right to demand certain liberties is lessened as
he is now in a place owned by society at large, places that are only
open for specific purposes.  And the fifth is the farthest removed from
the center, whereby the person has entered a public space in which
there is no expectation that the right at issue would be exercised, be-
cause the purpose for which the person has access to this government
location has nothing whatsoever to do with that right.  The protection
afforded by the pertinent fundamental liberty radiates from the
center, and diminishes as a person treads further from that central
purpose for which the American people enshrined that right in the
Constitution.
There are several theoretical questions to be asked regarding mat-
ters outside the Second Amendment’s inner core.  When the Second
Amendment applies, are the ends sufficiently important and the
means sufficiently tailored that the individual interest outweighs the
public interest?  Or does the Second Amendment not apply at all be-
cause the burden is per se beyond the bounds of the historical reach of
the right applied in a modern context?  While that discussion may
seem as unproductive as debating how many angels can dance on the
head of a pin, these are necessary questions to grind a philosophical
lens through which to conceptualize Second Amendment issues.
A. Similarities Between First and Second Amendments
Leading jurists are recognizing that the First and Second Amend-
ments enjoy a shared foundation.  Justice Scalia expressly compared
permissible restrictions on the Second Amendment as analogous to
those permissible to speech under the First Amendment,64 as did
Judges Diane Sykes and Diarmuid O’Scannlain.65  The interests may
be different, but the fact that both Amendments guarantee interests
that share common characteristics reinforces the theory that they can
likewise share a common doctrinal framework for judicial review.
64. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“Of course the right
[to bear arms] was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free
speech was not.  Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right
of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the
First Amendment to protect the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.”  (cita-
tion omitted)).
65. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1194–99 (9th Cir. 2014); Ezell v.
City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the First and Sec-
ond Amendments both protect “intangible and unquantifiable interests”).
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The First Amendment is implicated when a speaker possesses in-
formation and is placed under “restraints on the way in which the in-
formation might be used.”66  Both “the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment.”67  As the case law and literature discussed in this Article show,
the Second Amendment is implicated when a person seeks to procure,
possess, carry, or use bearable firearms that are descendants of those
known to the Framers—as well as certain other weapons—for any
lawful purpose, including collective defense and personal self-defense.
Both ownership and possession of such “arms” are within the Second
Amendment, as are ancillary aspects of gun ownership, such as the
meaningful ability to acquire ammunition, practice with firearms,
transport arms between locations, and have ready access to firearms
in everyday settings.
The conceptual foundation for the reach of both Amendments is
coextensive and coterminous.  “The protections of the Second Amend-
ment are subject to the same sort of reasonable restrictions that have
been recognized as limiting, for instance, the First Amendment.”68  So
the rationales justifying various speech restrictions should be analo-
gous to corresponding restrictions of the right to bear arms.
Like other fundamental rights, the courts must ensure the rights
of the minority are given full protection against majority will ex-
pressed through the normal democratic process.  Although many citi-
zens might find firearms objectionable, in that regard it is no different
than speech, which is protected even if it moves people to unhappy
tears or inflicts great pain.69  “Those who seek to censor or burden free
expression often assert that disfavored speech has adverse effects.”70
Similarly, advocates of gun control try to characterize criminological
data as showing that firearm ownership—or owning certain types of
arms—is detrimental to society.
Setting aside the debate of whether those arguments accurately re-
flect empirical data, it ignores the countermajoritarian role of the judi-
ciary.  A central impetus for constitutional protections is that they
protect unpopular things.  If something is popular, then its proponents
can often marshal public opinion to codify its protection in law.  It is
unpopular speech that requires judicial protection, because that un-
popularity can lead to politicians enacting or allowing measures cen-
soring that speech.  Similarly, it is the role of the courts to protect
unpopular exercises of the Second Amendment, as this fundamental
66. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984).
67. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011).
68. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007) aff’d sub nom.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
69. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
70. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2670.
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right serves vital liberty interests, which can be imperiled in the wake
of televised tragedies or when the arms under discussion have a physi-
cal appearance that is easy to demonize or demagogue.
Like the Free Speech Clause, the Second Amendment is “premised
on mistrust of governmental power.”71  Freedom to share information
and opinions regarding the issues of the day, and regarding those who
wield or seek power, is a condition precedent to enlightened democ-
racy. Heller discussed the Second Amendment as a safeguard against
government tyranny.72  Beyond that, in securing a private right to
self-defense against criminals, the Second Amendment recognizes the
reality that when a crime is committed, often the only two persons
present are the criminal and the victim.  Without any cynicism, the
right recognizes that in any society—and especially in a society kept
free by having only limited government—the police are not omnipres-
ent to keep citizens safe at all times.
The paternalistic arguments offered against both Amendments fail
for the same reason.  “The First Amendment directs us to be especially
skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what
the government perceives to be their own good.”73  This showcases the
mistrust of government power underlying that right.  So too, many
gun-control measures are predicated upon the belief that ordinary
people are not competent to own or use firearms, whether they are
licensing regimes that require onerous testing of knowledge or profi-
ciency, or impose protracted delays or byzantine registration systems
to obtain arms.74
This list of similarities is not exhaustive.75  But taken with the ma-
terial discussed in this Article, these similarities strongly suggest that
judicial efforts to protect both fundamental rights can proceed in
tandem.
71. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882 (2010) (discussing the Framers’ First
Amendment purposes).
72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600 (2008). See also infra section
IV.B (suggesting three questions to determine the proper level of scrutiny when
analyzing a law that burdens an individual’s right to keep and bear arms).
73. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996).
74. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2011) (detailing
Chicago’s post-McDonald licensing and registration system).
75. For example, the conventional idea that overbreadth doctrine only applies in the
First Amendment context is incorrect, as it can be applied to certain other funda-
mental rights as well.  Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 261 (1994).  It can be applied to Second Amend-
ment challenges as well, though a full discussion of that issue is beyond the scope
of this Article.
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B. Normative Principles of Per Se Rules and Strict Scrutiny
This Article’s theory is premised on several principles.  Two of
them are normative, yielding benefits to various aspects of judicial re-
view, not just the Second Amendment.
1. Reviving Strict Scrutiny to be Sufficiently Strict
Strict scrutiny must be worthy of its name; “strict” should be truly
“strict,” not merely “significant.”  It should take more than a good col-
lege try to satisfy strict scrutiny.  Otherwise aspects of liberty encap-
sulated in fundamental rights will lack the vigor the Supreme Law of
the Land should command in a free society.  That is why strict scru-
tiny is “the most demanding test known to constitutional law.”76
For a Second Amendment example, a district court upheld the
felon-possession restriction of firearms under strict scrutiny.77  Such
cases simply cite the elements of strict scrutiny in a formulaic fashion,
then in a cursory manner assert that protecting society from criminals
is a compelling interest and whatever the gun-control measure is also
happens to be narrowly tailored, and that is the end of it.  It cannot be
that simple.  While everyone should agree that a confessed axe mur-
derer should not be able to have a gun (or an axe, for that matter), is
strict scrutiny satisfied by a prohibition so broad that a non-violent
white-collar felon like Martha Stewart can never defend herself in her
own home?78  Is there a compelling public interest in protecting soci-
ety from overzealous home decorators with annoying politics and a
penchant for lying through her teeth about her financial investments?
It seems doubtful that a child dressed in a Martha Stewart costume on
Halloween would strike terror in anyone’s heart, and with good rea-
son.  Martha Stewart with a gun is no more threatening than Martha
Stewart decorating a wedding cake, yet federal law categorically ex-
cludes her from owning a gun as a vile menace to society.
Yet the problem goes much broader than Second Amendment
cases.  The courts have emasculated strict scrutiny.  Under strict scru-
tiny, content-based restrictions are presumptively invalid,79 shifting
the burden to the government.80  As such, government must be truly
tasked with carrying that burden, not merely checking a box.
Regarding narrow tailoring and compelling interests, Chief Justice
Earl Warren acknowledged some imprecision in designating certain
public interests “compelling” versus others that are instead merely
76. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
77. See United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2009).
78. See generally Marshall, supra note 59.
79. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
80. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
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“important.”81  It is incumbent upon courts to draw that line carefully,
reserving the label “compelling” for public interests of the highest
magnitude, and not calling anything “narrowly tailored” that is not
laser-beam focused on effectively advancing that interest with as close
a fit as a key inserted into a door lock.
But in 2003 the Court significantly degraded strict scrutiny.  Dis-
crimination based on race is subject to strict scrutiny.82  In Grutter v.
Bollinger, the Court declared that the intangible benefits of racial di-
versity in college classrooms were a truly compelling public interest
and that racial preferences were narrowly tailored to achieve it.83  In
McConnell v. FEC, the Court invented another compelling interest:
that giving campaign contributions can create the mere appearance of
possible corruption without any evidence of actual corruption, and
that preventing such an appearance is a compelling public interest.84
The Court held 5-4 that a statute criminalizing organizational politi-
cal speech as a felony was narrowly tailored to advance this novel
compelling interest.85  Such scrutiny is no longer “strict” in any mean-
ingful sense.  These cases give the appearance of being results-driven,
ad hoc expedients designed to reach foreordained policy outcomes.  It
is true that strict scrutiny should not be “strict in theory but fatal in
fact.”86  “But the opposite is also true.  Strict scrutiny must not be
strict in theory but feeble in fact.”87
Strict scrutiny must be rehabilitated.  A Second Amendment
framework where strict scrutiny is worthy of its name is one where,
when triggered, the burden will only survive if its public purpose is of
paramount importance, and where government very carefully devises
a law narrowly achieving this critical interest, without burdening the
right in any other respect.  This can be achieved if the framework
reserves such an exceptionally-daunting obstacle for a limited class of
restrictions, leaving most others to a less demanding standard.  Strict
scrutiny will remain strict only if it is not regularly invoked.  That
way, when triggered by laws that cut to the core of the Second Amend-
ment (or any other fundamental right), it should prove the undoing of
the law at issue except in those rare cases where government truly
satisfies this usually-fatal standard.88
81. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
82. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005).
83. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
84. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143–52, 221 (2003), overruled by Citizens United
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010).
85. Id. at 203–09.
86. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
88. Core Second Amendment interests—burdens on which thus warrant strict scru-
tiny—are discussed infra in subsection V.A.1.
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2. Clarity of Per Se Rules
However, there are situations in which even strict scrutiny proves
insufficient to vindicate constitutional rights.  Those are (1) categori-
cal bans on firearms, and (2) firearm confiscations, both of which will
be discussed in section V.B.
This Part of the Article, which discusses rationales and normative
principles, explicitly notes that—all things being equal—per se rules
are preferable to any form of ends-means analysis.  Courts face an eas-
ier task when hornbook law dictates that something is either legal or
it is not.  The public benefits from certainty and clarity, and the courts
benefit as scarce judicial resources are not expended upon meritless
claims, or upon spending more time performing a multistep analysis
than simply citing a rule that unequivocally dictates a result that can
be stated in one sentence.
Per se rules are also employed by drawing the line—frequently dis-
cussed in this Article—of determining whether the Second Amend-
ment applies in a given situation.  Some will result in a quick “yes.”
For example, whether the right applies outside the home, since a per-
son is more likely to have need of a means of self-defense when walk-
ing the streets at night than in the more-secure environment of their
own home.89  Others will note the existence of the line but require
considerable study to determine which side of the line controls.  For
example, under English common law, “the offence of riding or going
armed, with dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the
public peace, by terrifying the good people of the land.”90  Is there such
a limit to the Second Amendment, and if so, does it only exclude
scythes and halberds, or might the right exclude certain weapons that,
realistically speaking, many people might want to use?  These rulings
will draw clear lines that will hopefully build this jurisprudence in a
predictable and coherent fashion.  And the judiciary should easily dis-
pose of certain prohibitions, such as per se holding that law-abiding
adults ages eighteen through twenty possess Second Amendment
rights, and strike down the federal prohibition allowing these adult
citizens to purchase and possess handguns, but not purchase them
from a licensed firearm dealer.91
Per se rulings will also take off the table certain questions wherein
courts are giving short shrift to the Second Amendment.  The Second
and Fourth Circuits have held that near-absolute bans on carrying
firearms outside the home are constitutional, applying a faux interme-
89. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
90. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *148–49.
91. See NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185
(5th Cir. 2012) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1) (2012)).
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diate scrutiny that more resembles rational-basis review.92  Those
courts have simply recited the elements of intermediate scrutiny dis-
cussed in Part V in a formulaic fashion, with an approach that
presumes the validity of the gun control measure at issue, and predict-
ably sustains it.  Such a deferential reaction to the government’s talis-
manic assertion of “public safety” is not a proper application of any
form of heightened scrutiny.  The Supreme Court should rule defini-
tively that the Second Amendment applies in force outside the home,
and box the inferior courts into setting a high bar for laws that burden
that right.
C. Disparities Between the First and Second Amendments
Before exploring the core theory in this Article, it is helpful to note
the limits of analogizing the First and Second Amendments.  There
are two ways in which they are indisputably different, and a third in
which they should be regarded as different.
First, the two ways in which free speech rights are clearly different
from the right to bear arms.  One is entirely self-evident: Guns are
deadly, and the government has a vital interest in protecting the pub-
lic from illegal violence.  The other is less evident, but no less beyond
debate: As a matter of original meaning and practical modern applica-
tion, certain persons cannot exercise the Second Amendment.  The
third is debatable, but very likely true, that the Second Amendment is
a right that inheres in national citizenship, not in personhood.  While
every human being has First Amendment rights to free speech and
freedom of religion, it is possible that only citizens have a legal right to
demand access to firearms in America.
Before discussing those three, it is worth noting there are other
aspects wherein the First and Second Amendments diverge.  Where
these issues are implicated, courts should not follow a free-speech
approach.
The clearest of these is the rule against prior restraints, where the
government requires a permit of sorts before the speech is uttered.
“[A]ny system of prior restraints comes . . . to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”93  But when it
comes to firearms, many restraints are prior restraints.  It over-
reaches to argue there is a heavy presumption of invalidity regarding
all firearm licensing laws, and such a rule would be irreconcilable
with Heller and McDonald.
92. See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 879–81 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v.
Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89–97 (2d Cir. 2012).
93. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Next, in 1968 the Court suggested that when a given action con-
tained both speech and nonspeech elements, they could be subjected to
different levels of scrutiny.94  Such an argument fails in part because
the Court subsequently applied that same lesser form of speech pro-
tection (intermediate scrutiny) not only to tangential restrictions on
speech, but to speech content if it is commercial speech.  If courts were
to derogate isolated elements of gun ownership, such as saying the
Second Amendment does not include the right to obtain ammunition,
for example, then it could eviscerate the entire right.  A gun without
ammunition is little more than an expensive paperweight.  There are
concomitant elements aside from just buying, owning, and possessing
the firearm itself, and those matters must be protected to the same
extent as having the gun.
Another difference is the rule against compelled speech versus the
need for national security.  Government cannot coerce anyone to say
something they do not believe, because “freedom of speech prohibits
the government from telling people what they must say.”95  Without
this principle, free speech means little, for “[a]t the heart of the First
Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for him-
self or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving expression, considera-
tion, and adherence.”96  By contrast, national security is an existential
imperative.  The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to raise a
military,97 and separately provides for federalizing and arming state
militias for certain purposes.98  As long as citizens with contrary relig-
ious scruples are assigned to noncombat roles, the government can
compel the bearing of arms, and even conscript citizens into military
service.
1. Inherent Deadliness of Firearms
One obvious distinction between the two Amendments is that
words are not intrinsically, ipso facto dangerous in the same way as
firearms.  Children are told, “Sticks and stones may break my bones,
but words can never hurt me.”  Setting aside intentional infliction of
emotional distress and other literally harmful words, the basic truth
parents impress upon children remains that words are usually just
words; many may be painful and can be misused, but words generally
only have whatever power we choose to allow them.
If someone is a violent felon, or insane, or does not control his an-
ger, his words are still not inherently deadly.  While words can be
94. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
95. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Inst’l Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61 (2006)
(citations omitted).
96. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13.
98. Id. cls. 15, 16.
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 449
hurtful, they are rarely physically harmful.  The same cannot be said
for any such person with a gun.  While a criminal conviction in a court
of law for a specific crime provides what few would contest is a legiti-
mate process for depriving a person of a constitutional right (at least if
that crime is serious or violent), how exactly do we make such a defini-
tive and final determination for those with either mental problems or
a malignant disposition?
It must be acknowledged for the sake of public safety that there are
persons who have not been convicted of committing a serious crime or
crime of violence, but who nonetheless are manifestly dangerous to
themselves or others, and cannot be entrusted with a gun.99  Those
with paranoid delusions or hallucinations might take up arms against
innocent people whom the deranged person honestly believes pose a
deadly threat.  Even more difficult to deal with are people who are
simply evil; there are sadistic or depraved persons who function nor-
mally in society and are capable of otherwise-productive lives, but
nonetheless have complete disregard for the rights of others, including
the right to life.  These persons bereft of empathy and compassion are
no less dangerous, but they are harder to detect than the man scream-
ing in front of witnesses about a supposed threat that everyone else in
the room can conclude does not really exist.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments permit deprivation of lib-
erty, just not “without due process of law.”100  The question becomes
what sort of process is due to deprive an American citizen of this fun-
damental right.  Although a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of
this Article, scholars should engage in a vigorous debate on how you
deprive someone of the right to exercise the Second Amendment with-
out a conviction for relevant crimes.101  For example, if someone is
civilly committed for dangerous behavior, that is one thing.  But what
if a person is put into a counseling facility at age sixteen because he is
a “problem teenager” with exasperated parents, but matures into a
perfectly responsible adult?  As another example, if someone tells a
therapist that they are having difficulty controlling their fantasy of
killing a particular person down the street one could naturally con-
clude you do not want that person to access a firearm, but someone
seeing a therapist about “routine” depression who is prescribed a typi-
cal antidepressant medication should not automatically lose a right
guaranteed by the Constitution.  Policymakers will need to develop a
99. See Whether the Second Amendment Secures an Individual Right, 28 Op. O.L.C.
126, 189 n.261 (2004) (discussing Framing-era sources), archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/CSE9-FVSY.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
101. While certain misdemeanors—such as domestic violence—could plausibly lead to
disarmament, the right to bear arms cannot be considered truly fundamental if
nonviolent misdemeanors such as reckless driving or writing a bad check could
result in forfeiting the right.
450 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:429
clear framework in this highly sensitive area—one that implicates pri-
vacy involving often-delicate circumstances—and then courts will
need to subject that framework to judicial review.
In this regard the Second Amendment may be sui generis among
fundamental rights.  This issue of denying gun rights to those without
criminal convictions may prove to be one of the most challenging as-
pects of formulating workable judicial standards for the Second
Amendment, and is one area where the First Amendment framework
contains no clear guidance.  One Framer who was a leading legal au-
thority on the Constitution may have reflected the original meaning of
the Second Amendment when he wrote that a specific person could be
disallowed from bearing arms “attended with circumstances giving
just reason to fear that he purposes to make an unlawful use of
them.”102
Another peculiar concern involves police power.  States would seem
at first glance to have more latitude regarding firearms laws because
States have inherent authority to make laws governing public health,
public safety, and personal responsibility.103  This concern is not as
readily evident when exercising First Amendment rights.  But Mc-
Donald signaled that the Second Amendment right in the States is
coextensive with the right against the federal government,104 sug-
gesting that either the Court did not consider this police-power issue,
or has concluded that the federal right’s supersession of the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment completely defeats this addi-
tional state interest.
2. Some Persons are Beyond the Scope of the Second
Amendment
The two Amendments are also different because some persons are
beyond the scope of the Second Amendment, as discussed in subsec-
tion IV.B.1, while every person can claim free speech rights.  The
Court has suggested—if not actually held—that the Second Amend-
ment does not secure the right to bear arms for convicted felons.105
Justice Scalia indicated in Heller that the Court was not calling that
prohibition into question.106
Under narrow circumstances, beginning in 1938, certain felons—
those convicted of crimes of violence—could be debarred the posses-
102. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
126 (2d ed. 1829).
103. See infra cases cited note 198.
104. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 765 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
10–11 (1964)).
105. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980).
106. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 451
sion of firearms as a consequence of their conviction.107  In 1961, more
felons were disqualified from acquiring firearms that had traveled in
interstate commerce.108  Then, the Gun Control Act of 1968—the most
sweeping federal gun-control measure in American history—broad-
ened this prohibition to become almost absolute.109
This prohibition did not stop with felons.  After 1968, a person
“who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been com-
mitted to a mental institution” could not possess a firearm.110  Later,
under the 1996 Lautenberg Amendment, possession of a firearm be-
came a federal felony for a person convicted of a misdemeanor involv-
ing domestic violence.111
Lawyers debate whether all these prohibitions are consistent with
the right to bear arms.  Some constitutional scholars posit that a crim-
inal conviction does not categorically denude a citizen of Second
Amendment rights,112 while others argue that it can, at least when
the crime committed is a felony.113  The Fourth Circuit held that a
violent misdemeanor did not automatically negate Second Amend-
ment rights, but that for such misdemeanants, courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny.114
107. See Federal Firearms Act, ch. 850, § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938), superseded
by Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82
Stat. 197 (previously codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 901–10).  Although this provision
refers to persons convicted of a crime of violence, it lists twelve specific crimes,
eleven of which are “serious violent felonies” and only one of which is a misde-
meanor. See United States v. Skoien (Skoien II), 614 F.3d 638, 649 n.8 (7th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting); accord Marshall, supra note 59, at
698–707.
108. See Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757 (amending the Federal
Firearms Act to encompass “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term ex-
ceeding one year” instead of “crime[s] of violence.”).  This statute actually forbade
the “receipt” of a firearm; the prohibition was changed to “possession” in 1986.
See Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449.
109. See Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 922 (g), 82 Stat. 1213, 1220
(codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012)).
110. Id. § 922(g)(4), 82 Stat. 1220.
111. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f)
[§ 658(b)(2)(C)], 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–371 to –372, (sponsored by Sen. Frank
Lautenberg) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012)).  A crime of domestic vio-
lence is defined as any offense that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use
of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.”  18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii) (2012).
112. E.g., Marshall, supra note 59, at 714–28.
113. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations
and Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1359–64 (2009); ac-
cord United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich,
J., concurring); cf. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THE FOUNDERS’ SECOND AMENDMENT
273 (2008) (discussing the original understanding of whether the right to bear
arms extended to persons with criminal convictions).
114. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010); see also United
States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding that a categorical
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But courts might hold the federal statute stripping domestic-vio-
lence misdemeanants of the right to bear arms fails strict scrutiny.115
Although the High Court has designated preventing domestic violence
a public interest of compelling magnitude,116 courts might not hold a
lifetime bar on the right to self-defense the least restrictive means,117
at least when the offense does not rise to felony status.  The nature
and gravity of the offense should be relevant to whether an American
citizen forfeits her constitutional rights.
Judge Easterbrook wrote for the Seventh Circuit that Congress can
categorically forbid certain types of persons from possessing firearms
without a criminal conviction, civil commitment hearing, case-specific
findings, or judicial proceeding.118  This is a provocative position,
given that citizens cannot be shorn of any other fundamental right
without due process.  Easterbrook sidesteps this fact by pointing to
categorical denials of protection under the Free Speech Clause, the
examples he cites of obscenity, defamation, and incitement.119  But
those are categories of speech, not speakers; a person can escape the
restriction by declining to engage in that form of speech, but is free to
use any other speech.  One shudders to think of the public reaction if
the federal government attempted to strip another class of citizens (for
example, Republicans who identify as “Tea Party” supporters or Dem-
ocrats who identify as union supporters) of their First Amendment
rights to speak at rallies.  On the other hand—as already noted—fire-
arms are unlike speech in that they are inherently deadly, so plausible
arguments can be made that the government should deal with people
who are clearly dangerous but have not had a judicial proceeding.  The
challenge would be how to make and effectuate such determinations
consistent with due process, lest government create an expansive pro-
gram for unilaterally designating large numbers of people as unfit to
bear arms, defeating a central purpose of the Amendment.
3. The Right to Bear Arms is a Right of Citizenship
The third issue is whether noncitizens have a Second Amendment
right to bear arms.  The First Amendment rights discussed in this Ar-
ticle apply to all persons; every human being in this country enjoys
free-speech rights, as typical laws regulating billboards, radio broad-
casts, or book publishing make no mention of a person’s citizenship.
ban on gun ownership by domestic violence misdemeanants requires intermedi-
ate scrutiny).
115. See Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 811 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc on other
grounds, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
116. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
117. Skoien I, 587 F.3d at 811 n.5.
118. Skoien II, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
119. Id.
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Moreover, laws discriminating on the basis of alienage are subject to
strict scrutiny.120  Yet the Heller Court declared “a strong presump-
tion that the Second Amendment right . . . belongs to all Ameri-
cans.”121  That statement refers to citizens, not aliens—whether
legally present or not.122
The Court has upheld laws that treat noncitizens differently.  Not-
withstanding the general rule of strict scrutiny for such laws,123 vari-
ous statutes nonetheless survive challenges.  States may require their
government officers to be citizens.124  Restrictions have also been up-
held for police officers,125 probation officers,126 and public school
teachers.127  But the Court has invalidated citizenship restrictions on
receiving welfare payments,128 obtaining fishing licenses,129 licenses
to practice law,130 or becoming a notary public.131
The Second Amendment was designed as a check on governmental
power.132  As discussed in section V.B, it is a right of self-defense
against both public and private violence, codified in the Constitution
to guarantee the American people could effectively resist a tyrannical
regime.133  It is relevant regarding firearm possession to note that
aliens lawfully present are subject to being drafted into military ser-
vice,134 but that is as an instrumentality of government—an agent
120. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).  Laws that distinguish be-
tween legal and illegal aliens are subject to a lesser standard, which is officially
rational-basis review but occasionally looks more like intermediate scrutiny. See,
e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
121. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (emphasis added).
122. This statement becomes much more complicated due to the manner in which the
Court later held that the right to bear arms extends to the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Four Justices voted to incorporate the right into the
Due Process Clause, which applies to all persons, while Justice Thomas’ McDon-
ald concurrence the right belongs in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which
only applies to citizens.
123. It should be noted that as a matter of original meaning, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was not designed to convey the same protection regarding alienage that it
confers regarding race. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649–50 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. Boyd v. Nebraska. ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892).
125. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297–300 (1978).
126. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
127. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
128. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
129. Torao Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
130. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); but see id. at 730 (Burger, C.J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
131. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984).
132. THOMAS COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 271 (1880); see
also JOHN POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 239 (1868) (referring to the “usurpations of government”).
133. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
134. 50 U.S.C. app. § 454(a) (2012), upheld by Astrup v. INS, 402 U.S. 509 (1971).
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under governmental control—not the master of government, with an
inalienable right to abolish an oppressive regime.
Laws that allow the exclusion of noncitizens generally do so be-
cause states have an “interest in establishing [their] own form of gov-
ernment, and in limiting participation in that government to those
who are within the basic conception of a political community.”135  Con-
sequently, citizenship may be required for “officers who participate di-
rectly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy.”136  This concept is embedded in the Constitution itself, which
lists as requirements for various federal elected offices that the of-
ficers be citizens of the United States, for at least a requisite number
of years.137
Children have constitutional rights.138  This includes First Amend-
ment rights,139 even when attending public school.140  Yet children do
not have Second Amendment rights.  Even though these children are
citizens, rights pertaining to citizenship can be restricted to adults—
or at least those of responsible age.141  In these age-of-majority re-
strictions there are again parallels with voting rights.  Voting is like-
wise restricted to adults,142 despite being a fundamental right.
Restricting voting to citizens is entirely—even self-evidently—consti-
tutional.143  The American people express their consent to be gov-
135. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642–43 (1973) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
136. Id. at 647.
137. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Representatives must be a citizen for seven
years); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators must be a citizen for nine years); id. art. II,
§ 1, cl. 4 (President must have been a citizen from birth).
138. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
139. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
140. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  However, these rights can be dimin-
ished vis-a`-vis those exercised by adults. See id. at 396–97, 404–05.
141. For example, interstate travel is a fundamental right, but one secured by the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, not the Due Process Clause, and thus is a right
of citizens. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999); Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 36, 44 (1868).  A law denying a sixteen-year-old with a valid
driver’s license the ability to travel to an adjacent state would probably not sur-
vive judicial review.  But laws denying gun ownership to children will almost cer-
tainly be upheld.
142. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
143. See Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1904).  Other Supreme Court cases
are a mixed bag. Take for example Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).  The
Court referred to every citizen being entitled to legislative districts of equal popu-
lation so that each citizen would have an equal vote. See id. at 567–68.  However,
such populations include both citizens and noncitizens, meaning that some citi-
zens’ vote would count more than others, unless each legislative district had the
same number of noncitizens counted in its population, so as to dilute each citi-
zen’s vote by an equal amount.
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erned via the ballot box.144  The Second Amendment is the corollary
right to voting, which ensures that those in power govern only by the
consent of the governed.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has held that “the right to govern
is reserved to citizens.”145  Justice Thurgood Marshall later wrote for
the Court, “We have therefore lowered our standard of review when
evaluating . . . the exclusions that entrust only to citizens . . . [matters
that] go to the heart of representative government.”146  When a person
exercises a private right of self-defense, he is exercising an aspect of
the Second Amendment unconnected to these concerns.  Even then, it
is a separate question whether that right—which belongs to every
human being—carries with it the concomitant right to choose any in-
strumentality to effectuate self-defense.  In either event, state legisla-
tures are free to extend the right to bear arms to some or all
noncitizens to address these concerns.  Many noncitizens should be
able to obtain firearms for lawful purposes.  Such decisions, however,
are public-policy choices to be made by elected leaders, not constitu-
tional entitlements to be enforced by the courts.147
As discussed below in section V.B, private self-defense is not the
foremost purpose of the right to bear arms.  The Second Amendment is
a “doomsday provision,” triggered only in the exceptionally unlikely
event “where the government refuses to stand for reelection and si-
lences those who protest.”148  Such a right of exercising an ultimate
form of sovereignty that supersedes the United States government it-
self is one the Constitution reserves exclusively to the American
people.
IV. A THREE-STEP ANALYSIS FOR SECOND AMENDMENT
CASES USING FIVE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Heller offers only scant guidance on the applicable standard of re-
view for Second Amendment cases.  Although declining to declare a
level of scrutiny, the majority indicated that rational-basis review
does not apply,149 at least not to core exercises of the right by law-
abiding citizens.  But as the Seventh Circuit observes, “strict scrutiny
144. Cf. J. Kenneth Blackwell & Kenneth A. Klukowski, The Other Voting Right: Pro-
tecting Every Citizen’s Vote by Safeguarding the Integrity of the Ballot Box, 28
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 107, 107–08, 114–16 (2009).
145. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978).
146. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).
147. Again, this is only if Clarence Thomas is correct in situating this right in the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. See supra
notes 26 and 122 and accompanying text.
148. Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 570 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of reh’g en banc).
149. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 & n.27 (2008)).
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cannot apply across the board.”150  It has always been acknowledged
that the right to bear arms could be regulated to some extent, but to
what extent is open to debate.151
No constitutional right is absolute,152 as the Supreme Court has
repeated in the specific context of the right to bear arms.153  Not all
burdens on the right are an abridgement of the right to bear arms.
“McDonald emphasized that the Second Amendment limits, but by no
means eliminates, governmental discretion to regulate activity falling
within the scope of the right.”154  Effectuating this right while ad-
dressing governmental interests will prove an interminable challenge.
In tackling the questions arising from a virtually-infinite number
of permutations of personalized factors intersecting a daunting num-
ber of federal, state, and local laws, no single standard of review can
possibly apply the Second Amendment correctly.  It is not enough to
say that strict scrutiny applies, despite the fact that strict scrutiny is
the general rule for burdens on fundamental rights.155  One rule can-
not guarantee sufficiently robust protection for core exercises of the
Amendment by law-abiding and peaceable citizens in their daily lives,
while simultaneously accommodating valid governmental concerns re-
garding specific locations and dangerous persons, as well as incidental
burdens on Second Amendment rights.
Courts have understood the Justices’ statements as indicating that
courts should consult First Amendment principles when determining
whether a burden on the right to bear arms is consistent with the Sec-
ond Amendment.156  So there is a firm foundation for exploring how a
common doctrinal framework can protect both rights.  This Article at-
tempts to do so both by examining what the Supreme Court has held
regarding free speech and the right to bear arms, as well as surveying
lower courts’ efforts to develop a coherent framework.
At least five circuits apply a two-part test: First, does the chal-
lenged law fall within the scope of the Second Amendment?  If not,
then the inquiry ends.  If within that scope, some argue the second
step is to ask: Does the challenged law meet the applicable level of
150. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 614
F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
151. See, e.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
350 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1972) (1868).
152. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (First Amendment).
153. E.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
155. See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
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scrutiny?157  This sequential approach is a logical method for judicial
review.158
The model set forth in this Article is consistent with this two-step
approach.  But explicitly adding an additional element for a three-step
approach makes even more sense, as it provides a rationale for which
of five levels a court must choose, depending on the severity of the
burden and the character of the property wherein the citizen is at-
tempting to exercise the right.  Such an intermediate step highlights
the public versus private distinction, which is what requires either
more rigorous scrutiny or less demanding scrutiny.  Courts must draw
a distinction between public and private lands.  They must recognize
both the additional concerns that can be cited to justify regulations in
public places that are inapplicable to private homes, and realistically
alleviate pressure on judges to apply an unduly-restrictive standard
on core exercises of the right.  Otherwise, the Second Amendment will
lack the broad reach and robust character that attends other funda-
mental rights, such as those codified in the First Amendment.
A. Five-Tiered Scrutiny Framework for Second Amendment
The highest form of protection under the Free Speech Clause ap-
plies to viewpoint-based discrimination, where even strict scrutiny
does not suffice.  The courts have always held viewpoint restrictions
unconstitutional,159 and viewpoint discrimination is per se invalid as
a categorical rule.160  For content-based restrictions that do not differ-
entiate between viewpoints, strict scrutiny applies,161 under which
the law is presumptively invalid,162 and will only be upheld if the gov-
ernment can show the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
public interest.163  Content-neutral regulations are subject to interme-
diate scrutiny,164 and will be upheld if the law is substantially related
to an important government interest.165
157. See NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,
194–95 (5th Cir. 2012); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703–04 (discussing cases in four
circuits).
158. See Lund, Standards of Review, supra note 12, at 1633–36.
159. E.g., Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789,
804 (1984).
160. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107–13 (2001); see
also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 361–62 (2003) (holding that content-based
restrictions can be valid if they are viewpoint-neutral).
161. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
162. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 235 (2003) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
163. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
164. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
165. This is the standard formulation under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g.,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  Intermediate scrutiny for speech regu-
lations sometimes invokes the narrow-tailoring prong normally associated with
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If a person is speaking on public land, then courts perform a pub-
lic-forum analysis.  If the location is either a traditional public forum
or a designated public forum, then the three levels described above
apply on the same terms as they would on private land.166  If the pub-
lic location is a limited public forum, then the government can restrict
speech in additional viewpoint-neutral ways consistent with the lim-
ited purpose for which the public has access to that location.167  In a
nonpublic forum, government can impose any reasonable restrictions
that are viewpoint-neutral.168  Reasonableness is synonymous with
rational-basis review, under which the regulation is presumptively
valid, and the challenger must show it is not rationally (i.e., reasona-
bly) related to any legitimate public interest.169
Utilizing a multitiered approach is not unique to free speech, with
voting perhaps the most apparent example.  Voting is a fundamental
right,170 and laws burdening that right are subject to one of three
levels of scrutiny.  Severe burdens on the voting franchise are subject
to strict scrutiny.171  Laws that discriminate between similarly situ-
ated voters without burdening the right to vote itself are subject to
rational-basis review.172  Measures that burden the right of casting a
ballot, but not severely, are subject to a balancing test that is a form of
intermediate scrutiny.173  Under this last, relatively lenient standard,
restrictions on voting need only be (1) reasonable, (2) neutral with re-
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99
(1989).  This Article argues that the equal-protection variation is more desirable
for a Second Amendment framework.
166. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267–70 (1981).
167. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); see
also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(holding that the government must respect the boundaries of a limited forum in a
viewpoint-neutral manner).
168. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992).
169. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
Any law is that is rationally related to advancing a legitimate public interest is
reasonable.  Conversely, any law not rationally related to legitimate interests is
unreasonable.  One struggles to hypothesize a law that would fail rational-basis
review yet be reasonable, or vice versa.
170. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
171. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
172. See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807–09 (1969).
173. When examining such incidental burdens, courts:
weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consider-
ation the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights.
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)).
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gards to political viewpoints, and (3) justified by important
interests.174
The judiciary should adapt the free-speech approach to the Second
Amendment.  While voting rights are exercised occasionally, Second
Amendment rights are exercised daily, just like First Amendment
rights.  Usually voting is exercised at a specified location within a nar-
row time period, while First and Second Amendment rights are exer-
cised in countless settings and contexts.  As such, the Free Speech
Clause provides a closer analogue.
While no manmade system is without flaws, this five-tier free-
speech approach has proven effective.  Thus if a city is issuing permits
for an abortion rally, it is per se invalid to issue a permit to a pro-
choice group while denying one to a pro-life group.  If the city wishes
to ban discussion of abortion at all and either group sues, a court will
apply strict scrutiny in making the city justify its prohibition.  If the
city issues the permit for a rally to be held between 2:00 p.m. and 6:00
p.m. (regulating time), in a park (place), without loudspeakers or bul-
lhorns (manner), a court will apply intermediate scrutiny.  But if pro-
life or pro-choice citizens wish to speak on the issue at a public library
(a limited public forum), the library can assign them to a closed-door
room, limit their number to those that can safely fit in that room, and
require them to use “inside” voices.  If they are in an airport (a non-
public forum), the federal government could ban discussing abortion
altogether with other travelers, so long as the authorities do not allow
one side to speak while banning the opposing side.
B. Three Questions to Determine Proper Level of Scrutiny
Courts should adopt a three-step approach for analyzing laws that
arguably burden the right to keep and bear arms.  Step One assesses
whether the Second Amendment applies both to the weapon at issue
and to the person attempting to assert the right.  Step Two assesses
whether the challenged law pertains to arms on public land versus
private land.  Then Step Three assesses the appropriate level of con-
stitutional scrutiny.
1. Step One: Whether the Amendment Applies
Step One is an obvious threshold, asking at the outset whether the
Second Amendment applies at all.  This inquiry must be asked with
respect to the weapon (or weaponizable object) and also whether the
person in question can exercise Second Amendment rights.175  As al-
174. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 451–52
(2008).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89–93 (3d Cir. 2010); cf.
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1165–66 (10th Cir. 2012).
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ready discussed in more detail in section III.C, Heller suggests that
the Second Amendment protects weapons that are typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.176  If one is being re-
stricted from having an object and wishes to challenge the regulation/
restriction on Second Amendment grounds—whether that object is a
Browning pistol, an M-16 machinegun, a Tomahawk cruise missile, or
a teaspoon—it simplifies matters to begin with whether it is an “arm.”
Of those four objects, the first is, the second is debatable, and the lat-
ter two are not.177
Although at first it may seem a convenient dodge to refer to certain
objects as categorically outside the Second Amendment, the same is
true for the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court has long held that
“some categories of speech [are] unprotected as a matter of history and
legal tradition.  So too with the Second Amendment.”178  As Judge
Sykes explains:
[I]f the government can establish that a challenged firearms law regulates
activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was
understood at the relevant historical moment—1791 or 1868—then the analy-
sis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected, and the
law is not subject to further Second Amendment review.179
The central purpose of the free-speech guarantee is fostering open
discussion of matters of public concern.180  Consequently, the Court
has recognized at least nine types of content that are unprotected by
the Free Speech Clause.181  Such unprotected types of speech include
advocating lawlessness,182 obscenity,183 defamation,184 criminal
speech,185 “fighting words,”186 child pornography,187 fraud,188
176. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623–25 (2008). But see Lund,
Standards of Review, supra note 12, at 1628 (inferring from a specific passage in
Heller that the Court was avoiding such a suggestion).
177. Justice Scalia implied in Heller that machineguns are not protected. See Heller,
554 U.S. at 624–25.
178. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)).
179. Id. at 702–03.
180. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (holding that political speech is central to the Free Speech
Clause).
181. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (plurality opinion).
182. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
183. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).
184. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–69 (1964).  Evidently
defamatory speech receives intermediate scrutiny, but defamation automatically
fails because it never satisfies the ends-means criteria of that standard of review.
For more discussion, see infra notes 376–80 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 495–97 (1949); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (criminalizing knowingly telling a falsehood to a fed-
eral agent).
186. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
187. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982).
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threats,189 or grave and imminent threats to public order.190  Part of
the counterintuitive rationale for these exclusions is that doing so ac-
tually furthers free speech and thought.191  There may be other types
of unprotected speech, though the Court is loath to declare others.192
While many mistake the basic scope of the Second Amendment,
both as a matter of original meaning and of practicality, there are cer-
tain weapons that are not shielded by the Second Amendment, and
certain persons who cannot exercise the Second Amendment.193  One
is the difference between “arms” and “ordnance,” disposing of ques-
tions about weapons characterized by large “booms.”  In 1789, explod-
ing weapons were ordnance, in contradistinction to arms.194  Thus
rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, missiles, and
modern cannons are all categorically outside the right to bear arms.
Additionally, “keep and bear” implies a limitation.  The Second
Amendment extends “to all instruments that constitute bearable
arms.”195  Thus, “bear” suggests a weapon that an average adult could
carry over distances.  This excludes extraordinarily large firearms—
such as an antiaircraft gun—from Second Amendment protection.
When conducting this first step of a Second Amendment analysis,
courts must be required to begin by presuming that the Second
Amendment applies.  This initial presumption will prevent courts
from dodging difficult questions or eliding legitimate Second Amend-
ment claims.  The burden must be on the government to demonstrate
188. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771–73 (1976).
189. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969).
190. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
191. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality opinion).
192. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010); cf. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011).  Justice Clarence Thomas persua-
sively argued for another type of unprotected speech. See id. at 2751–61
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the original meaning of the Free Speech
Clause did not include a seller’s right to communicate with children without pa-
rental consent, or a child’s right to access material of which his parents disap-
proved).  Some false statements are also protected by the First Amendment,
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2547, 2551 (plurality opinion), though this holding is wrong
for the reasons expressed by the dissent, see id. at 2556–65 (Alito, J., dissenting).
193. Scholars are beginning to recognize this fact. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categori-
calism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 375, 413 (2009) (“Heller categorically excludes certain types of ‘people’ and
‘Arms’ from Second Amendment coverage, denying them any constitutional pro-
tection whatsoever.”).  While many will draw these lines in the wrong places—
especially among those who previously advocated the collective-right theory and
thus did not accept that any private person had any right to possess any weap-
ons—the fact remains that these limits do exist, and so they must be explored.
194. See David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1199 (2010) (quoting
State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94, 98 (Or. 1980)).
195. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (emphasis added).
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that both law and history show the Second Amendment does not ap-
ply.  If any such evidence is inconclusive, the Second Amendment
must be considered,196 and courts must proceed to the next step.
2. Step Two: Public Location Versus Private
Steps Two and Three determine which level of scrutiny applies.
There are five such levels.  From one end to the other, these move
from the most deferential standard to one that is so bereft of deference
that perhaps nothing government says justifies the restriction.  Step
Two dictates whether the public-forum doctrine applies.  If on public
land, then under the public-forum doctrine the standard of review is
determined by whether that particular government land or facility is a
(1) traditional or designated public forum, (2) limited public forum, or
(3) nonpublic forum.  Since under the state-action doctrine the Second
Amendment only applies to government actors,197 private property
owners are generally free to decide whether to allow those visiting
their property to possess firearms at all.198  As with free speech, a
person on his own land enjoys broader protections under the Second
Amendment than on public property and one of three standards of re-
view discussed in Part V governs.  Most fact patterns for Second
Amendment cases at Steps Two and Three involve either a person on
his own land, or on government land.
3. Step Three: Identifying Level of Scrutiny
Step Three determines the level of scrutiny a court must apply in
that situation.  If the person is on private land, heightened scrutiny
always applies.  The restriction is subject to strict or intermediate
scrutiny, or could even be per se invalid.  These are also the options in
a traditional or designated public forum.  If the location is instead a
limited public forum, Second Amendment rights (like First Amend-
ment rights) can be further restricted in any manner that maintains
the purpose for which the forum is open.  If the location is a nonpublic
196. See Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011).
197. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194–97
(1989).
198. The right of ownership includes the right to exclude others from entering your
property.  Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).  Most private-
property owners have a near-absolute right to exclude firearms. See id.  The
most likely exception would be public accommodations, such as restaurants and
hotels.  Even then, however, it is possible that the right might extend no further
than keeping a firearm locked in your vehicle when you are, for example, eating
your meal at a restaurant.  It is possible that there is no judicially-enforceable
right in such places, yet states still have power to make laws pertaining to public
safety and personal responsibility, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270
(2006); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996), such as allowing em-
ployees to have firearms in their locked vehicles.
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 463
forum (of which the courts to date only recognize three such types of
publicly-accessible locations), then the government can restrict it in
any manner that is reasonable, so long as it does not violate the core
purpose of the right to bear arms.
These five levels are explained more below in Parts V and VI.
V. THREE FORMS OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLY TO
BURDENS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT
ON PRIVATE PROPERTY
“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were un-
derstood to have when the people adopted them.”199  Taking this per-
spective, the Second Amendment was adopted as a fundamental right
in 1791, so just like its First Amendment sibling, burdens on the right
to bear arms in modern times must be accorded the breadth and
strength reflected by heightened scrutiny, consistent with the vigor
the Framers designed both Amendments—along with other provisions
in the Bill of Rights—to carry against government infringement.
Heightened scrutiny is designed to systematize the impact that
rights should effectuate if those rights are fundamental in status.
Such heightened scrutiny would even attend ancillary aspects of the
Second Amendment, such as the ability to buy ammunition or the abil-
ity to practice with firearms.  As a leading nineteenth-century treatise
explains, “No doubt, a citizen who keeps a gun or pistol under judi-
cious precautions, practises in safe places the use of it, and in due time
teaches his sons to do the same, exercises his individual right.”200
Recognizing that fact, one significant inconsistency in an other-
wise-excellent opinion was Judge Sykes’s reasoning that “Heller’s ref-
erence to presumptively lawful gun regulations” renders intermediate
scrutiny “the most appropriate standard of review.”201  While pre-
sumptive validity attaches to rational-basis review,202 a presumption
of unconstitutionality attends any form of heightened scrutiny—either
strict or intermediate.203  It is erroneous to say that presumptive va-
lidity leads to that result, since Heller’s problematic reference to pre-
sumptively valid regulations is the aspect of Heller most incompatible
with heightened scrutiny.
199. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
200. BENJAMIN VAUGHAN ABBOTT, JUDGE AND JURY: A POPULAR EXPLANATION OF LEAD-
ING TOPICS IN THE LAW OF THE LAND 333 (New York, Harper & Brothers 1880),
quoted in Heller, 554 U.S. at 619.
201. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. As a general matter, acts of Congress enjoy a strong presumption of constitution-
ality.  United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (plural-
ity opinion).
203. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 (1982)).
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Furthermore, while courts are deferential to policymakers under
rational-basis review, heightened scrutiny looks skeptically at govern-
ment, insisting the government prove its measures actually advance
sufficiently vital public interests to justify burdening constitutional
rights.204  When heightened scrutiny is applied, no matter if the inter-
est pursued is truly compelling (strict) or simply important (interme-
diate), the government action must actually work to “accomplish that
purpose.”205
When properly applied, strict scrutiny is exceedingly difficult to
satisfy, because courts accord great “deference to the primacy of the
individual liberties the Constitution secures.”206  Thus the deference
to government power under rational-basis review is inverted, defer-
ring instead to the superseding instrument that limits government
power.  Under the former, judicial restraint means giving every bene-
fit to democratically-elected political actors.  Under the latter, judicial
restraint means letting the American people’s Constitution fulfill its
role in securing liberty by constraining those same political actors.
When judicially reviewing most laws—even when there is no plau-
sible way the state’s purported interests are advanced by its chosen
means—courts are to search for some legitimate purpose that the
challenged measure might advance, and sustain the law if such an
interest can be identified.207  Not so with strict or intermediate scru-
tiny.  When applying heightened scrutiny, courts cannot “supplant the
precise interests put forward by [the government] with other
suppositions.”208
Whether triggered by the First Amendment or the Second, height-
ened scrutiny alters the calculus in a very significant way, premised
on deep skepticism of government’s true aims or valid concerns.  “The
First Amendment requires heightened scrutiny whenever the govern-
ment creates ‘a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.’”209  Politicians are unlikely to take issue with
which football team is better or whether a particular restaurant’s best
dish is the steak versus the chicken.  When a government disagrees
with a message, frequently that message is critical of the government.
204. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
205. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986)).  It is reasonable to assume that courts should be more
skeptical when strict scrutiny is invoked than when applying intermediate
scrutiny.
206. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 811 n.5 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc on other grounds,
614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
207. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
208. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
209. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
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Judge O’Scannlain writes for the Ninth Circuit that “only regula-
tions that substantially burden the right to keep and bear arms trig-
ger heightened scrutiny under the Second Amendment.”210  This is
true if substantial burdens include those on the time, place, and type
of firearm, or if any limitation of an eligible person possessing a con-
stitutionally-covered firearm is per se a substantial burden.  Other-
wise, that statement is certainly not the case for the First
Amendment, where as discussed in section V.C, even incidental bur-
dens enjoy heightened protection.  Only by regularly applying height-
ened scrutiny can courts truly recognize the right to bear arms as a
fundamental right on par with other foundational liberties.
Nor should there be a tenure exception to the Second Amendment.
The D.C. Circuit holds it is reasonable to presume that longstanding
regulations do not burden the constitutional right to bear arms.211
Why?  That puzzling statement is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding other enumerated rights, including
First Amendment religious liberty.212  Under this theory, as long as
the government has gotten away with violating the Constitution long
enough, judges eventually presumed the infringement is okay.  The
appellate court’s reasoning is further undermined by the fact that the
Second Amendment has only been judicially recognized nationwide as
an individual right since 2008, so preexisting infringements could not
have been effectively challenged.
There is “no principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of con-
stitutional values. . . . ”213  Since both the First and Second Amend-
ments codify fundamental rights, they must be attended by equal
force.  “To view a particular provision of the Bill of Rights with disfa-
vor inevitably results in a constricted application of it.  This is to dis-
respect the Constitution.”214  Consequently, government may not
“treat the right recognized in Heller as a second-class right, subject to
an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guar-
antees.”215  Heightened scrutiny should be equally common in judicial
review involving either Amendment.
210. Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2011).
211. Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
212. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (“Standing alone, historical
patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional
guarantees . . . .”).
213. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 484 (1982).
214. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428–29 (1956).
215. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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A. Strict Scrutiny for Burdens on Core Second Amendment
Right
We begin with the familiar territory of strict scrutiny.  Laws bur-
dening fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny.216 Heller
“suggests, at a minimum, that gun laws that severely restrict the core
Second Amendment right identified in Heller—that of ‘law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home’—
should receive exacting scrutiny.”217  That term is not particularly
helpful, as it is sometimes employed when referring to strict scru-
tiny,218 but more often refers to intermediate scrutiny.219  Judge Di-
ane Sykes’s context indicates intermediate scrutiny, as she is
speaking of the “minimum” standard that should apply, which would
be nonsensical if referring to strict scrutiny.  As professors (should)
tell students, it is important not to get stuck in Label-Land, remem-
bering that the courts are bound by the actual words of decisional law,
not the post-hoc gloss whereby academics try to systematize what the
judiciary does.  Nonetheless, when the central components of funda-
mental rights are burdened, the scrutiny that should follow must be
strict—in fact, as well as in name.
Surveying various common-law restrictions on the right to arms,
Judge Laurence Silberman reasoned that the restrictions at bar did
“not impair the core conduct upon which the right was premised.”220
This approach is perfectly reasonable, provided that it does not define
the core of the Second Amendment so narrowly as to enable courts to
give inadequate effect to a right that the Supreme Court has specifi-
cally held is fundamental.
Some federal appeals courts apply rational-basis review to laws
that do not burden the core of the Second Amendment.221  This bor-
ders on the absurd.  One would search in vain for any other fundamen-
tal rights where a law that does not burden the “core” of the right gets
relegated to such a minimal form of protection—merely the general
constitutional prohibition against irrational laws.  Instead, so long as
a person is on private land instead of public land, at the very least
intermediate scrutiny should attach.  When on private land, height-
216. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
217. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)), rev’d en banc
on other grounds, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
218. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
742–43 (2007) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289–91
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
219. See, e.g., Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008).
220. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis ad-
ded), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
221. See, e.g., United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2012).
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ened scrutiny should always be triggered when the Second Amend-
ment applies to the person and weapon at issue.
1. Core Burdens Undermine the Purpose of the Amendment
Every constitutional right is designed to serve a particular pur-
pose.  A burden on the core of that right undermines the very purpose
for its codification.  Courts must apply the most unforgiving scrutiny
to government measures that intrude upon a fundamental right in a
manner that undermines the impetus for that right’s inclusion in the
Constitution.
Once again, take the First Amendment as a comparator.  The Free
Speech Clause is meant to advance the nation’s interest in “uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open” debate.222  Consequently, “[a]s a general
matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter,
or its content.”223
Free speech is a fundamental right, so strict scrutiny applies when
certain types of restrictions are placed on speech.224  Specifically,
strict scrutiny applies to content-based discrimination,225 which re-
stricts discussion of certain subjects, as this cuts to the core of the
right protected by the First Amendment.226  This content-based trig-
ger for speech is more precisely the protection afforded “core speech”
or “pure speech”—which is to say, political speech,227 as opposed to
commercial speech (discussed below).  Such speech goes to the central
liberty protected by the Free Speech Clause.228
“Both the right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complimentary components of the broader concept of individual free-
dom of mind protected by the First Amendment.”229  As such, both
coercing individuals to speak, and forcing them to subsidize the
speech of others with whom they disagree, are subject to strict scru-
tiny.230  One seminal case invalidated a law requiring students to say
222. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
223. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)).
224. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
225. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
226. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) (“[T]he fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment [is]
that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”).
227. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010).
228. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980).
229. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
230. Id. (citing United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).  Strict scrutiny sometimes does
not apply to compelled speech if it concerns disclosing “purely factual and uncon-
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the Pledge of Allegiance as violating both the Free Speech Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause,231 and is the foundational case of this com-
pelled-speech doctrine.  Treading upon either part of this judicially-
recognized core of free speech triggers strict scrutiny.
Correspondingly, this is the level of scrutiny that should attend
burdens on the core of the Second Amendment.  To “keep” arms means
to have custody,232 or retain possession,233 and to “bear arms” means
troversial” commercial advertising to prevent misleading consumers, Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651
(1985), or general commercial speech which is subject to intermediate scrutiny,
see infra section V.C.  Even when Zauderer is implicated, however, some Justices
signal there are limits on the extent to which government can compel speech
under the aegis of disclosure. See, e.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1343–44 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
231. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). It should also be
noted that one recent Supreme Court case invoked this rule in a broader First
Amendment context. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of “legislative prayer,” the opening of policymaking bodies’
sessions with an invocation.  134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).  In doing so, the Court
reaffirmed its first legislative prayer case. See id. (reaffirming Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).  But the Court went much further than simply restat-
ing Marsh.  In upholding legislative prayer in 2014, the Court eschewed the
“endorsement test” that it has often used in Establishment Clause cases since
that test’s adoption in 1989, a test which asks whether a hypothetical “reasonable
observer” would believe that the government is endorsing religion. County of Al-
legheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburg Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 578–79, 620 (1989).  In that
5–4 decision, the Court narrowly adopted Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s novel
theory proposing the endorsement test from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
687–88 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a vig-
orous dissent for four Justices in Allegheny, arguing that the Establishment
Clause is instead violated when a person is coerced to participate in a religion or
religious exercise against his conscience. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  The dissent also
insisted that any test—such as the endorsement test—that “would invalidate
longstanding traditions cannot be a proper reading of the [Establishment]
Clause.” Id. at 670.  Consistent with this last point, in Town of Greece—which
was also written by Justice Kennedy—a majority of the Court declared as the
general test for the Establishment Clause that courts must conduct a historical
inquiry and invalidate state actions that historically would have been regarded
by the Framers as an establishment of religion. See Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at
1819; see also id. at 1820–24.  The final part of Justice Kennedy’s opinion was a
plurality opinion for three Justices, in which he wrote that for practices that pass
muster under this history-based test, courts must also look to see whether it sat-
isfies the “coercion test” that he set forth in his Allegheny dissent. See id. at
1824–27 (plurality opinion).  The plurality expressly cited Barnette during this
discussion, see id. at 1825 (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642), tying this rule from
the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to encompass also the Es-
tablishment Clause, and broadly casting it as “an elemental First Amendment
principle.” Id. Town of Greece thus appears to represent a major doctrinal shift in
First Amendment jurisprudence.
232. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008) (quoting SAMUEL JOHN-
SON, 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1095 (4th ed. 1773) (reprinted
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to carry them234—defined broadly to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the
person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose of being armed
and ready for offensive or defensive action . . . .”235
Congress and the ratifying States chose those words for a specific
purpose.  The right to bear arms was understood by the founding gen-
eration “to be an individual right protecting against both public and
private violence.”236  The latter is quite clearly a right of self-defense
against criminals.  This right of self-defense was propounded by politi-
cal philosophers whose writings were foundational to the Framers
such as Locke, Hobbes, and Montesquieu,237 with a long lineage
through the centuries.238
The former requires more explanation, and includes the right to
withstand government oppression that crosses the line into tyranny.
As Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote when serving on the California
Supreme Court pre-Heller, “Extant political writings of the [Foun-
ders’] period expressed a dual concern: facilitating the natural right of
self-defense and assuring an armed citizenry capable of repelling for-
eign invaders and quelling tyrannical leaders.”239  The Heller Court
1978)).  This dictionary is often used by the Court in defining terms in the Consti-
tution’s text.  Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(citing, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003)), aff’d sub nom. Heller,
554 U.S. 570.
233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 583 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (reprinted 1989)).
234. Id. at 584 (collecting sources).
235. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 214 (6th ed. 1990)), aff’d, Heller, 554 U.S. at
584, 586.
236. Heller, 554 U.S. at 594.  Hunting is also a secondary right under the Second
Amendment.
We are not suggesting that keeping and bearing firearms for hunting
falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment; to the contrary . . .
Heller specifically stated that “Americans valued the ancient right . . .
for self-defense and hunting.”  We . . . only . . . clarify that [this law] does
not strike at the heart of the Second Amendment right as explicated in
Heller.
Skoien 1, 587 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599), rev’d
en banc on other grounds, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).  Because hunting is not a
core aspect of the right to arms, there are governmental regulations regarding
hunting that would not be permissible if impairing self-defense.  Hunting can be
characterized as an aspect of self-reliance for those dependent upon it to provide
food, in which case it would at least partially share a philosophical foundation
with self-defense.
237. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (Marshall Missner ed., 2008) (1651); JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT § 16 (1690); BARON DE SECONDAT
DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS [THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS] bk. X, ch. 2
(1748).
238. See James Warner, Disarming the Disabled, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 267,
269–74 (2008).
239. Kasler v. Lockyer, 2 P.3d 581, 602 (Cal. 2000) (Brown, J., concurring).
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noted approvingly that contemporaneously with the adoption of the
Second Amendment, nine state constitutions specified a right to bear
arms for purposes of both personal self-defense and defending the
state,240 reasoning that this dual purpose was also embodied in the
federal right.241  As Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain wrote for the Ninth
Circuit, the “right contains both a political component—it is a means
to protect the public from tyranny—and a personal component—it is a
means to protect the individual from threats to life or limb.”242
This dual-right concept is rooted in early case law.  As a Louisiana
court put it, the Second Amendment right “is calculated to incite men
to a manly and noble defence of themselves, if necessary, and of their
country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly as-
sassinations.”243  That final reference is interesting, as in modern so-
ciety where many gun owners prefer carrying their firearms in a
concealed fashion, it is worth noting these courts speak of this right as
specifically a right to carry firearms openly, not necessarily
concealed.244
Some discuss the right of self-defense as one arising under natural
law.245  This is a two-edged sword.  On one hand, it is a helpful con-
straint on government power in that it reinforces the concept that cer-
tain rights are inalienable; the American political philosophy accepts
some rights as conveyed by a source that transcends civil authori-
ties.246  On the other hand, uncoupling judicial power from an ap-
proach grounded in the text, structure, and history of American
positive law in general and the Constitution in particular invites un-
constrained judicial philosophical musing and quasi-academic specu-
lations of foreign laws and cultures that are quite different from
America’s, introducing a greater likelihood of interpreting the Consti-
tution incorrectly.  In this instance, referencing natural law reinforces
the constitutional text as a codification of the American people’s ac-
knowledging the right to bear arms as one antedating the Republic,
derived from the “laws of nature” underlying the Declaration of
Independence.247
240. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 585 n.8 (2008) (listing provisions).
241. Id. at 584–85.
242. Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 451 (9th Cir.), vacated for reh’g en banc, 575 F.3d
890 (9th Cir. 2009).
243. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850).
244. See Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613 (2008).
245. See, e.g., David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for
the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235, passim (2008).
246. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
247. Id. para. 1.
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The American right codified “the natural right of resistance and
self-preservation” recognized under English law.248  Although self-de-
fense is the central aspect of the right secured by the Second Amend-
ment, defense against common criminals was not the impetus for the
codification of the Amendment.249  The overriding concern was in-
stead raising a bulwark against unchecked government power.250  Of
the thirty-seven States in the Union when the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was ratified in 1868, twenty-two had an express right to bear
arms,251 many of which explicitly denominated a right to self-
defense.252
And by that year, this right was not just one against federal power;
the focus of this concept shifted to guarantee a right against state
power.  Justice Alito observed:
By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of the
Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Govern-
ment would disarm the universal militia—had largely faded as a popular con-
cern, but the right to keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of
self-defense.253
What began in the Constitution as a focus to make sure the new na-
tional government did not become too powerful expanded to become a
concern for individual humans against oppressive government force at
any level.  Though given the vast resources of the federal government,
the greatest possible threat from governmental overreaching will
likely always be found at the national level.
The nation’s ever-lengthening existence without a tyrannical re-
gime seizing power caused the antityranny rationale to recede vis-a`-
vis personal self-defense, but that fortuitous fact does nothing to viti-
ate the initial concern’s legitimacy.  The Founders’ concern regarding
an oppressive, authoritarian ruler resulted in an intergenerational in-
surance policy, intended as a safeguard for the next century more
than for the next decade, as the further into the future one looks, the
less certain one can be about the political environment or form of gov-
ernment that will be hold sway in America.
248. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *139.  The Supreme Court recognizes that
Blackstone’s work “constituted the preeminent authority on English law for the
founding generation.”  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
249. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599.
250. Id.
251. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitu-
tions when the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are
Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 50 (2008).
252. See, e.g., id.
253. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 770 (2010) (citing MICHAEL D. DOUBLER,
CIVILIAN IN PEACE, SOLDIER IN WAR 87–90 (2003); AKHIL AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 258–59 (2000)).
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2. The Standard Strict Scrutiny Formulation
Government actions triggering the “most rigid scrutiny”254  “are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling
governmental interests.”255  Government cannot satisfy strict scrutiny
by invoking “broadly formulated interests justifying the general appli-
cability of government mandates.”256
Narrow tailoring means that the government’s action is “precisely
tailored” to achieve the goal.257  That is to say, it must be necessary to
the accomplishment of the goal.258  The challenged measure must ac-
tually achieve the compelling interest it purports to serve.  “Precision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our
most precious freedoms.”259
Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively invalid.260
When strict scrutiny applies, the government bears the burden of
proving that the reasons for the challenged measure are “clearly iden-
tified and unquestionably legitimate.”261  The same must be true for
the Second Amendment.
Courts must set a high bar under strict scrutiny, but not an insu-
perable barrier.  While the inherent deadliness of firearms will likely
make it easier for governments to satisfy the compelling-interest as-
pect of strict scrutiny, courts must nonetheless be inflexible in de-
manding that the means chosen to satisfy those interests are truly
narrowly-tailored, with a singular focus on achieving that objective in
the least restrictive manner, burdening the right to arms no more
than absolutely necessary.
B. Per Se Invalidity for Firearm Bans or Confiscations
Yet sometimes even strict scrutiny is not enough.  In those rare
instances, courts must completely shut the door on a species of gun
control via a categorical rule that such a restriction is per se invalid.
In these situations, the rebuttable presumption of invalidity that at-
tends strict scrutiny must be elevated to an “irrebuttable” presump-
tion, whereby no interest can be so compelling, or no means can be
254. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)).
255. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) (internal citation
omitted).
256. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficent Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431
(2006).
257. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 299 (1978)).
258. Id. at 2418 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (Powell, J., concurring)).
259. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
260. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–92 (1992).
261. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 448, 533–35 (1989) (quoting Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 469, 533–35 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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sufficiently narrow, to ever allow such a restriction.  That is because
such a restriction goes beyond burdening the core of a fundamental
right, and instead violates the indispensable heart of the right, which
government may never do.  The Supreme Court held that the right to
bear arms was specifically codified in the Constitution because the
founding generation was especially concerned that the federal govern-
ment might someday wish to disarm them.262  So that is one thing the
Second Amendment categorically forbids.  It is a burden that ipso
facto impermissibly infringes upon the right.
For the First Amendment, the verboten infringement is viewpoint
discrimination.  Irrespective of subject matter, there is never an in-
stance where one viewpoint on the subject is allowed, but the opposing
viewpoint is not.  In a political discussion, government can never say
that one can support Democrats, but not Republicans, or support abor-
tion, but not oppose it.  Viewpoint discrimination is per se unconstitu-
tional.263  While the Supreme Court has never definitely ruled on that
question, and some disagree with this assertion of per se invalidity,264
the Supreme Court should clearly so hold in an appropriate vehicle
case presenting that question, and forever dispel the caveats.  The
Court’s language is that waiving restrictions on a favored speaker or
denying equal treatment to a disfavored speaker “would of course be
unconstitutional.”265  On any given subject, government cannot say
you may speak about this issue only if you take the side the state
favors.266
For the Second Amendment, the analogous nonstarter is disarming
society regarding common firearms.267  The essential heart of the Sec-
ond Amendment is to enable American people to resist tyranny, and so
one arms restriction that can never be allowed is for the government
to assert any justification for rendering the people defenseless against
their rulers.  Scholars link the right to personal self-defense to the
262. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
263. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1988); Members of the City Council of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
264. E.g., Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Tran-
scending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2426 n.44 (1997).
265. Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 325 (2002) (emphasis added).
266. The government does not engage in viewpoint discrimination when it conditions
taxpayer funding used for messages on the grantee not using those funds to dis-
seminate a message that is contrary to government policy. Rust v Sullivan, 500
U.S. 173, 193 (1991).  For example, Congress can decline family-planning funding
to an organization that will use those funds to promote abortion as a form of
family planning. See id. at 192–200.  Lawmakers cannot prohibit an organization
for taking a pro-life versus pro-choice viewpoint, but the First Amendment does
not compel lawmaking to fund such speech.
267. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 724 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It is the
rare law that ‘destroys’ the right, requiring Heller-style per se invalidation.”).
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right to fend off tyranny.268  It is a particular type of self-defense, one
that the Constitution never allows government to abrogate.  The Sev-
enth Circuit notes that the Supreme Court suggested certain gun-con-
trol laws are categorically invalid.269  And there is need for such an
absolute rule.
During the ratification of the Constitution, “fear that the federal
government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through
[the military] was pervasive.”270  Antifederalists objected to the pro-
posed Constitution for this reason,271 and Federalists defended the
proposed Constitution on the grounds that “because Congress was
given no power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and
bear arms, such a force could never oppress the people.”272
The Second Amendment was designed to inoculate the American
people against such a political disease.  When the citizens “of a nation
are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyr-
anny.”273  Access to arms and a motivating interest to attain profi-
ciency in those arms could empower the citizens of the new nation to
preclude an overbearing government of the type they saw through
history.
These lessons from history were not merely known to the Framers
as students of world history, or even more specifically as men well-
versed in European history.  America’s pedigree was distinctly Brit-
ish.  The Framers were keenly aware that British monarchs of the
previous century disarmed political dissidents as a precursor to op-
pressing them.274  They wished to prevent America from walking in
the path of the nation from which they had just forcibly broken away.
268. E.g., Kopel, Natural Right, supra note 245, at 243 (“Although personal self-de-
fense is not specifically mentioned in the Declaration of Independence, that natu-
ral right is the intellectual foundation, in Western philosophy, of the right of the
people to defend all their natural rights by using force to overthrow a tyrant.”)
(footnote omitted).
269. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Both Heller and McDon-
ald suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment
right—like the handgun bans at issue in those cases . . . are categorically
unconstitutional.”).
270. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 598 (2008).
271. Id. at 598 (citing, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 234, 242 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981); John
Smilie, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
508-09 (Merrill M. Jensen ed. 1976)).  It is noteworthy that the Bill of Rights—
including the Second Amendment—had not yet been proposed, but Scalia later
adds that the addition of the Second Amendment did not allay the Antifederal-
ists’ concerns. Id. at 604.
272. Id. at 599 (citing four sources in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT 38, 40,
275–81, 556 (David Young ed., 2d ed. 2001)).
273. Id. at 598.
274. Id. at 594 (citing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF
AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT 31–53 (1994); LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION
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As such, the Framers sought to safeguard the American people
against a similar fate.  Congress has broad and sweeping power to
raise and arm military forces under the control of the federal govern-
ment.275  That military would be under the exclusive authority of a
single Commander-in-Chief.276  The Constitution had to foreclose this
military becoming an instrumentality of subjugation.  The Framers
understood that “history show[s] that the way tyrants had eliminated
a militia . . . was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away
the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to sup-
press political opponents.”277
The Framers’ solution was to have the civilian population spread
throughout the country so well armed that an organized military force
would find it impractical to reduce the citizenry to despotism by mar-
tial force.  “It was understood across the political spectrum that the
right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be
necessary to oppose an oppressive military force if the constitutional
order broke down.”278
This idea was essential to secure the Constitution’s ratification and
set the baseline of political thought in the Early Republic.279  Federal-
ists cited the ubiquity of private firearm ownership among the general
American population to ameliorate Antifederalist concerns that “a
strong federal government would lead to oppression and tyranny.”280
Framing-era legal scholars touted the Second Amendment as a safe-
guard against the federal government overstepping its bounds.
No clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived to
give to congress a power to disarm the people. . . .  But if in any blind pursuit
of inordinate power, either [Congress or state legislatures] should attempt it,
this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on both.281
Perhaps the foremost American authority on Blackstone in the
early Republic was Henry St. George Tucker.282  Designating the En-
glish right to bear arms as the precursor of the Second Amendment in
OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 76 (1981)); see THOMAS M. COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 270–72 (Rothman &
Co. 1981) (1880).
275. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755–58 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1918); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1942) (discussing
congressional powers for providing for the common defense).
276. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
277. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598.
278. Id. at 599.
279. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 778 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Klukowski,
Citizen Gun Rights, supra note 26, at 240.
280. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
281. RAWLE, supra note 102, at 125–26.
282. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (referring to Tucker’s work as the “most important”
Blackstone commentary).
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his seminal work on Blackstone,283 Tucker described the right to bear
arms as “the true palladium of liberty . . . .  Wherever standing armies
are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is,
under any colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not al-
ready annihilated, is on the brink of destruction.”284  Tucker stated as
a categorical rule that “prohibiting any person from bearing arms” is
unconstitutional.285  Justice Joseph Story made an identical claim,
writing, “One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish
their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming the people, and
making it an offence to keep arms . . . .”286
Those who say the weaponry employed by the modern U.S. mili-
tary makes talk of resisting tyranny antiquated fail to understand the
intended effect of such a right.  “The deterrent effect of a well-armed
populace is surely more important than the probability of overall suc-
cess in a full-out armed conflict.”287  It is not the certainty of military
victory, but rather the daunting prospect of an armed population
ready to defend themselves, that provides this deterrent.288  Advance-
ments in weaponry and the sheer size and discipline of the United
States Armed Forces mean this deterrent is not as effective as it
would have been two centuries ago,289 though doubtless most Ameri-
can troops would not participate in a campaign against their own
countrymen.  Even so, since a dictator wishes to rule over a country-
side rather than reduce it to an uninhabitable wasteland, and there-
fore must take territory with ordinary weapons rather than employing
weapons of mass destruction, tens of millions of gun owners spread
across such a vast land mass as the United States, each of those citi-
zens in their homes or similar shelter rather than on an open battle-
field, still pose a formidable obstacle to any would-be despot.
This overriding focus on ensuring against rogue governmental
power was also seen during Reconstruction.  There were systematic
283. 2 [HENRY] ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF
REFERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 143 n.d (1803).
284. 1 TUCKER, supra note 283, at App. 300.
285. Id. at 289.
286. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 450 (1840).  Justice Clarence Thomas quoted another work by Story ex-
pressing the same view. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1890, 746 (1833)).
287. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 383 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub
nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
288. Nelson Lund, The Past and Future of the Individual’s Right to Arms, 31 GA. L.
REV. 1, 56–58 (1996); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty,
and the Right to Self-Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 115 (1987).
289. Lund, Originalist, supra note 16, at 1373.
2014] SECOND AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 477
attempts to disarm blacks after the Civil War.290  The original appre-
hension that the federal government would disarm the people was re-
placed by the concern—with a stronger evidentiary basis—that the
States would seek to disarm some classes of its citizens,291 specifically
black Americans.  Indeed they did so, searching homes illegally and
punishing owners when they found weapons.292  The right to bear
arms—applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment—
addressed that concern.293
Whether in 1791, 1868, or the present, citizens cannot be denied
arms.  Measures that categorically ban law-abiding citizens from pos-
sessing usable firearms must be per se unconstitutional.  Absolute
bans come in two forms.  One completely forbids citizens from possess-
ing and having ready access to usable firearms.  The other is blanket
gun confiscations such as happened in New Orleans in 2005,294 since
its endpoint achieves that same result.  The Second Amendment never
tolerates government disarming its citizens.  “[T]he threat that the
new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by taking
away their arms was the reason that the right . . . was codified in a
written Constitution.”295
Such categorical bans also come in two forms.  One is seen in Heller
and McDonald, where citizens could not even possess common fire-
arms in the home.  Another would allow some gun possession within
the home, but categorically forbid any carrying of firearms outside the
home.  Illinois had such a law, until the Seventh Circuit invalidated
the statute in 2012.296
The Framers’ paramount purpose for the Second Amendment was
to resist a tyrannical government,297 an unlikely scenario to modern
290. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 771 (2010).  The irony of attempts to
disarm blacks during Reconstruction is highlighted by the fact that during the
Civil War blacks had been deliberately armed to participate in the war effort.
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at
8 (1988)).  These attempts to disarm blacks in the South led to Northerners in
Congress to press for a response at the federal level that would preempt these
“Black Codes” and ensure black Americans the right to bear arms. See STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS, 1866–1876, at 9 (1998).
291. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 772.
292. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward
an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 338 (1991).
293. See Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights, supra note 26, at 249–52.
294. See generally Stephen P. Halbrook, “Only Law Enforcement Will Be Allowed to
Have Guns”: Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearm Confiscations, 18
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 339 (2008).
295. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
296. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing various subsec-
tions of 720 ICLS 5/24).
297. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 583–85 (2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting
from the denial of reh’g en banc).
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Americans but one very much in the mind of eighteenth-century polit-
ical revolutionaries.  It is one that can never be allowed to fade com-
pletely from sight.  As Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit wrote
when his court voted against an individual right to arms pre-Heller:
The majority falls prey to the delusion—popular in some circles—that ordi-
nary people are too careless and stupid to own guns, and we would be far
better off leaving all weapons in the hands of professionals on the government
payroll.  But the simple truth—born of experience—is that tyranny thrives
best where government need not fear the wrath of an armed people.  Our own
sorry history bears this out: Disarmament was the tool of choice for subju-
gating both slaves and free blacks in the South. . . .  A revolt by Nat Turner
and a few dozen other armed blacks could be put down without much diffi-
culty; one by four million armed blacks would have meant big trouble.
All too many of the great tragedies of history—Stalin’s atrocities, the kill-
ing fields of Cambodia, the Holocaust, to name but a few—were perpetrated
by armed troops against unarmed populations.  Many could well have been
avoided or mitigated, had the perpetrators known their intended victims were
equipped with a rifle and twenty bullets apiece . . . .  If a few hundred Jewish
fighters in the Warsaw Ghetto could hold off the Wehrmacht for almost a
month with only a handful of weapons, six million Jews armed with rifles
could not so easily have been herded into cattle cars.
My excellent colleagues have forgotten these bitter lessons of history.  The
prospect of tyranny may not grab the headlines the way vivid stories of gun
crime routinely do.  But few saw the Third Reich coming until it was too late.
The Second Amendment is a doomsday provision, one designed for those ex-
ceptionally rare circumstances where all other rights have failed—where the
government refuses to stand for reelection and silences those who protest;
where courts have lost the courage to oppose, or can find no one to enforce
their decrees.  However improbable these contingencies may seem today, fac-
ing them unprepared is a mistake a free people get to make only once.298
The Second Amendment was written into the Constitution to en-
sure that a “citizens’ militia” outside governmental control could act
“as a safeguard against tyranny.”299  Kozinski—whose parents were
Holocaust survivors—penned his sobering explanation for why the
Framers regarded the right to bear arms as utterly nonnegotiable for
the American people.
C. Intermediate Scrutiny for Incidental Burdens
For incidental burdens of fundamental rights—burdens that do not
impinge the core of a fundamental right—intermediate scrutiny is
often employed.  To survive intermediate scrutiny, government must
demonstrate that the challenged state action is substantially related
to achieving an important public interest.300  More demanding than
the rational-basis test, this form of heightened scrutiny demands both
that the law at issue “directly advances a substantial government in-
298. Id. at 569–70 (citations omitted).
299. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008).
300. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also supra note 165 (discussing the
level of scrutiny afforded to Second Amendment regulations).
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terest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.”301
Since politicians typically say whatever they are doing is important,
courts must screen out those that are not by regarding a public inter-
est as important only if “the proffered justification is ‘exceedingly
persuasive.’”302
Intermediate scrutiny is designed to strike a middle ground be-
tween the “near-automatic condemnation” of strict scrutiny and the
“near-automatic approval” of rational-basis review.303  Intermediate
scrutiny has been described as “proportionality,”304 i.e., as requiring
that the means “fit” the ends “in proportion to the interest served.”305
Government must justify both the ends and the means, accounting
for burdens imposed and substantiating its claims with sufficient
proof.  Intermediate scrutiny requires not only that the public interest
be sufficiently important, but also that “the cost . . . be carefully calcu-
lated.”306  Whether the challenged action actually serves the asserted
interest cannot rest on “mere speculation or conjecture.”307  When em-
ploying this standard, “the public benefits of the restrictions must be
established by evidence . . . .  lawyers’ talk is insufficient.”308
But in most other respects this standard is more relaxed than
strict scrutiny.309  “Under intermediate scrutiny, the government
need not establish a close fit between the statute’s means and its end,
but it must at least establish a reasonable fit.”310  Overbreadth is not
inherently fatal to this inquiry, either.  “Intermediate scrutiny toler-
ates laws that are somewhat overinclusive,”311 accommodating “the
difficulty of establishing with precision the point at which restrictions
301. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667–68 (2011) (citations omitted).
302. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for Wo-
men v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1996)).
303. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
304. E.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006) (plurality opinion of Breyer, J.);
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring).
305. Bd. of Trs. of State. Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting
Posades de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1985)).
306. Id.
307. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 487 (1995) (quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)).
308. Annex Books, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis, 581 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 2009).
309. Some complain that intermediate scrutiny is not all that rigorous in practice.
E.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious
Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1260 (2008).  But this is a problem of application,
not principle.  If courts take intermediate scrutiny seriously, it imposes a signifi-
cant barrier to government regulation.
310. Skoien 1, 587 F.3d 803, 805–06 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis omitted), rev’d en banc
on other grounds, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
311. Id. at 815.  Overbreadth doctrine can apply to Second Amendment claims. See
supra note 75.
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become more extensive than their objective requires.”312  And unlike
strict scrutiny—under which no deference is given to legislative judg-
ments313—courts accord some limited deference to legislators when
applying intermediate scrutiny.314
But the government must still carry the burden of proof, which for
strict scrutiny requires a “strong basis in evidence” that the means
employed advances the purported interest.315  Although case law is
not clear regarding the strength of evidence required for intermediate
scrutiny, given that rational-basis review requires no evidence, it is
likely the state must introduce some evidence similar to “substantial
evidence” for agency fact-finding under the Administrative Procedure
Act.316  Likewise, while under strict scrutiny the means must be a pre-
cise fit,317 one that achieves the purported interest,318 here the
means-tailoring requires the government action directly advance the
asserted public interest to a material degree.319
Intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral regulations of
speech, those that are justified without reference to content.320  Con-
tent-neutral regulations of speech are deemed incidental burdens on
free speech rights.321  As with strict scrutiny, the burden rests on the
government to justify the regulation as consistent with the First
Amendment.322
Intermediate scrutiny is also the level of scrutiny that attaches to
commercial speech,323 owing to the subordinate position the Supreme
Court believes commercial interests occupy “in the scale of First
312. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).
313. See supra note 205 and accompanying textual paragraph.
314. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997)), rev’d in part on other grounds, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013).
315. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion).
316. Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 10(e), 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(E) (2012)).
317. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 333 (majority opinion).
319. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 626 (1995) (material degree); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (di-
rectly advance).
320. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986).
321. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968).
322. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993).
323. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564–65 (1980).  The circuits are split on whether inter-
mediate scrutiny attends compelled commercial speech. Compare United States
v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (intermediate),
with Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th
Cir. 2012); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir.
2006) (strict). See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (discussing com-
pelled speech).
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Amendment values.”324  Commercial speech is “expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”325
The Supreme Court asserts that government’s “power to regulate com-
mercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate com-
mercial speech that is linked inextricably to those transactions.”326
Even then, “[p]ermissible restraints on commercial speech have been
limited to measures designed to protect consumers from fraudulent,
misleading, or coercive sales techniques.”327  When commercial speech
is at issue, government has authority not only to restrict false speech,
but also speech that is deceptive or misleading.328  The test from Cen-
tral Hudson is “whether the regulation directly advances the govern-
ment interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is
necessary,” and the public interest purportedly served by the chal-
lenged state action must be “substantial.”329  And again, the govern-
ment bears the burden of proof.330
Also, consider slander and libel.  Although it is possible that alleg-
edly defamatory speech is not demonstrably false, it is nonetheless ac-
tionable in tort because free speech “is not the only societal value at
issue” in such situations.331  For this reason, although slander and li-
bel laws may in fact chill protected speech, there is no unconditional
immunity from liability for defamation.332  Compensating defamed in-
dividuals for the harm to their reputation is a “strong and legitimate”
public interest.333  The intermediate level of scrutiny for false speech
is also illustrated by the fact that defamed individuals can recover
even when the defamation was the result of mere negligence, not just
intentionally or knowingly false speech.334  It is doubtful that holding
someone liable for negligent speech would satisfy strict scrutiny.
324. Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (quoting Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
325. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
326. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (quoting Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
327. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (footnote
omitted).
328. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771–72 n.24 (1976).
329. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.  The Court actually frames this as a four-part
test, with the first step determining whether the speech comes within the orbit of
the Free Speech Clause. Id.  I do not frame it as such because that aspect of the
inquiry occurs in Step One of this Article’s proposed approach. See supra subsec-
tion IV.B.1.
330. Thomas v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
331. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 348.
334. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774 (1986).  However, such
negligent statements evidently enjoy greater protection than intentional defama-
tion.  The Court invalidated both presumed and punitive damages for negligent
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While strict scrutiny attends questions of whether a citizen may
possess a common firearm, intermediate scrutiny attends questions of
how and when a citizen may possess those same arms.  As historically
accepted burdens on the right to arms show, “the state has a right to
prescribe a particular manner of carry, provided that it does not cut
off the exercise of the right.”335  An example of this is requiring serial
numbers on firearms.336
Registering firearms is separate from a government registry speci-
fying which citizens own each specific firearm.  “The registration of
firearms gives the government information as to how many people
would be armed for militia service if called up.”337  However, it is also
a prerequisite to effectively confiscate all firearms in society to disarm
the citizenry.  So not only is Judge Silberman correct in suggesting
that courts should look askance at certain gun regulations because the
Second Amendment’s right is broader that the civic purpose of equip-
ping a militia,338 some such regulations could actually help defeat the
core of the right secured by the Amendment.
Judge Sykes applied the intermediate test under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, saying, “we ask whether the government has established
that the statute is substantially related to an important governmental
interest.”339  In Sykes’ two-tiered approach discussed previously, she
adds, “Laws that restrict the right to bear arms are subject to mean-
ingful review, but unless they severely burden the core Second
Amendment right of armed defense, strict scrutiny is
unwarranted.”340
Whether a court articulates the line as Sykes has, or takes the sim-
ilar approach outlined in this Article, the question remains of finding
where a judge steps down the stair from strict to intermediate scru-
tiny.  A quick and easy parallel with free speech would be to say that
these are regulations on the time, place, and manner of firearm own-
ership.  But firearms retain enduring characteristics that can distin-
guish one type from another.
It is far beyond the scope of this Article to explore that topic in
detail.  Instead, I suggest research on each of the following items.
defamation because such a sanction “unnecessarily exacerbates” the chilling of
protected speech. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
335. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1172 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nunn
v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 248 (1846)) (internal editing marks omitted).
336. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2012) (prohibiting possessing firearms where serial number
has been “removed, obliterated, or altered”).
337. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
338. See id. at 389 (citing Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 801–07 (1998)).
339. Skoien I, 587 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 614
F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
340. Id. at 812.
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First, the caliber of a firearm is a nonissue for the Constitution.  Al-
though no one attempts to suggest that a .40-caliber pistol is subject to
different rules than a .22, some politicians try to make an issue of .50-
caliber firearms.  Second, much more persuasive arguments can be
made that fully automatic firearms (i.e., machineguns and sub-
machineguns) should not be treated the same as common firearms.
While some would argue there is no Second Amendment protection at
all, that position is likely wrong unless someone can explain why.  It is
much more likely that keeping and bearing these firearms is subject to
intermediate scrutiny, and that it will be much easier to show in court
how many restrictions would satisfy intermediate scrutiny, with the
result that these firearms are unlikely to play a greater role in Ameri-
can society than they currently do.
Intermediate scrutiny would also apply to a broad range of permit-
ting and licensing systems.  So long as these concern the times and
places a person could carry firearms, they would fit neatly into the
way the law conceptualizes speech.  Although many such issues would
involve public property, rather than homes, oftentimes in traditional
or designated forums the standards of review would be the same as on
private land, and it is in that context that intermediate scrutiny will
be most often seen.
For example, the Second Circuit upheld “imposing fees on the exer-
cise of constitutional rights . . . when the fees are designed to defray
(and do not exceed) the administrative costs of regulating the pro-
tected activity.”341  It suggested such fees might be unconstitutional if
they were “so high as to be exclusionary or prohibitive.”342
But even assuming such licenses are constitutional at all, there
must be stringent limits to survive heightened scrutiny.  A fee of $20
would be one thing, but if a city that is hostile to gun rights—such as
New York City—set up an excessively elaborate administrative sys-
tem that the city claimed justified a $200 fee, that must fail under
intermediate scrutiny.  With this standard of review, courts should
not only disallow “prohibitive” costs, but also anything more than a
minimal burden.  And if this license is required to possess a common
firearm in the home, it should be struck down anyway under interme-
diate scrutiny.
It is plausible to suggest that the government could have a regis-
tration system for extraordinary (meaning exceedingly unusual and
dangerous) weapons such as Class III firearms (i.e., fully-automatic
machineguns), but that such a system would be unconstitutional if it
attempted to register ordinary firearms.  But such a system must still
survive intermediate scrutiny, so the burden would be on the govern-
341. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
342. Id. at 166.
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ment to show that it is substantially related to achieving some impor-
tant interest.  Courts should be inflexible in forcing government to
make its case, brushing aside feel-good assurances from politicians
and instead demand persuasive evidence that such systems substan-
tially advance important interests.
The touchstone must be that government “may not destroy the
right to bear arms in public under the guise of regulating it.”343  Inter-
mediate scrutiny regulates the manner of exercising the Second
Amendment; it never prevents that exercise.
VI. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE APPLIES TO BURDENS
ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT
ON PUBLIC PROPERTY
The public forum doctrine was first proposed in a 1965 law review
article,344 and was adopted by the Court in 1972.345  This doctrine is
central to free-speech jurisprudence, leading one scholar to claim “the
story of the First Amendment is the story of the public forum doc-
trine.”346  Henceforth, the story of the Second Amendment may also
be the story of the public forum doctrine.
The public forum doctrine manages the nexus of individual liberty
expressing itself in government-owned places.347  The doctrine is
rooted in dictum in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations,
where Justice Owen Roberts explained that streets and parks “have
immemorially been held in trust . . . and . . . been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.”348  That dictum was subsequently elevated to a
holding, and been repeatedly reaffirmed.349  In 1972 the Court added
that in such places “justifications for selective exclusions . . . must be
carefully scrutinized.”350
343. Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1174 (9th Cir. 2014).
344. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3.
345. See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 205 (1995) (discussing Police
Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 n.6 (1972)); Kenneth L. Karst, Public
Enterprise and Public Forum: A Comment on Southern Productions, Ltd. v. Con-
rad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248 n.7 (1976).
346. Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1535 (1998).
347. See generally Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History
and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987) (discussing the
development of the public forum doctrine and proposing that public and nonpub-
lic forums should be distinguished on the basis of the nature of the government
action involved).
348. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organizations, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plu-
rality opinion) (dictum).
349. E.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 743 (1990).
350. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98–99.
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Every facility and parcel of land is either privately owned or gov-
ernment owned.  But people do not shed their constitutional protec-
tions whenever they set foot on government land, therefore a doctrine
is necessary to protect rights while recognizing that the person is now
on government premises.  “Without a baseline expectation that free
expression on public property is appropriate, such balancing tests
tend to favor the government.”351
In our democratic society, citizens must often go to a government
location to assert rights or obtain services.  “In the First Amendment
context, the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that one is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.”352
Americans need not choose to forfeit their constitutional protections
against government in order to access places held in common by all.
It is almost self-evident that “in an open democratic society the
streets, the parks, and other public places are an important facility for
public discussion and political process. . . .  [The extent to] which such
facilities are made available is an index of freedom.”353  It should be
equally obvious that if an American citizen has a fundamental right to
bear arms in self-defense, then the extent to which he may do so in
these places where interpersonal contact is at its zenith somehow fits
into this liberty matrix as well.
A. The Need for the Public Forum Doctrine for the Second
Amendment
“To confine the right to be armed to the home is to divorce the Sec-
ond Amendment from the right of self-defense described in Heller and
McDonald.”354  Yet the factors discussed in this Article—especially
the inherent deadliness of firearms—make clear that there are police-
power concerns (especially public safety) that government must grap-
ple with when citizens carry firearms in public.  The reasons for the
public forum doctrine for First Amendment issues apply a fortiori for
Second Amendment issues.
Both the Constitution’s text and logic dictate that the Second
Amendment extends beyond the home.  The textual case is clear.  “The
right to ‘bear’ as distinct from the right to ‘keep’ arms is unlikely to
refer to the home.  To speak of ‘bearing’ arms within one’s home would
at all times have been an awkward usage.  A right to bear arms thus
351. Note, Strict Scrutiny in the Middle Forum, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2140, 2140 (2009).
352. Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Schad v. Borough
of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76–77 (1981) (internal citation and quotation marks
omitted)).
353. Kalven, supra note 344, at 11–12.
354. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
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implies a right to carry a loaded gun outside the home.”355  Surely the
right to bear arms means something more than carrying it from your
living room to your bedroom, as the Supreme Court’s reasoning dic-
tates.  “Both Heller and McDonald do say that ‘the need for defense of
self, family, and property is most acute’ in the home, but that doesn’t
mean it is not acute outside the home.”356  Constitutional rules must
delineate those rights, especially once a person sets foot on the side-
walk or street at the edge of their property.
Judge Silberman wrote that “it is presumably reasonable ‘to pro-
hibit the carrying of weapons when under the influence of intoxicating
drink, or to a church, polling place, or public assembly, or in a manner
calculated to inspire terror . . . .”357  Certain prohibitions seem reason-
able, such as saying you cannot carry firearms if you are publicly in-
toxicated.  Others do not seem reasonable at all, such as some States’
laws saying you cannot carry into a church; each church’s leadership
should be perfectly free to decide whether to allow their employees or
members to carry firearms.  This is especially true for close-knit
churches that function as families, where instead of anonymous stran-
gers, members know each other and are actively engaged in their
church’s life.  But that aside, such regulations still beg the question of
how high a bar the Constitution sets for such regulations, and how
that bar is raised or lowered in spaces controlled by government.
Though it may seem counterintuitive, applying public forum doc-
trine should enhance gun rights in public, rather than restrict them.
Without this doctrine for free speech, government officials would be
tempted to completely bar expression, fearing that once any meaning-
ful speech is allowed, they cannot draw a line to keep it from becoming
a cacophony.
The same rationale applies to gun rights in public spaces.  Al-
lowing firearms does not mean public parks would become the Wild
West.  As the forum allows government to impose significant addi-
tional restraints, public officials may feel more comfortable—as is
often the case for public speech—in not attempting draconian restric-
tions.  While some restrictions may be slapped down in court, such
efforts are long, expensive, and unpredictable.  Government opening
the doors wide ab initio of its own accord could both avoid such pro-
tracted litigation and allow citizens to better exercise this fundamen-
tal right.
355. Id. at 936.
356. Id. at 935 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008)).
357. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting State
v. Kerner, 107 S.E. 222, 225 (N.C. 1921)), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570.
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Public forum doctrine is not a panacea.  It has received more than
its share of thoughtful criticism,358 such as some scholars saying it is
“an edifice now so riven with incoherence and fine distinctions that it
is on the verge of collapse.”359  I am more sanguine about this doc-
trine, since with consistent application the lines between different fo-
rum types can be clarified.  Although such refinement will not result
in a flawless doctrine, such perfection is always unattainable anyway
when flawed human beings seek to systematize into an imperfect legal
framework the behavior of other flawed human beings.  While many
scholars’ egos will refuse to acknowledge these undeniable limits of
human effort, hopefully judges will not let the perfect be the enemy of
the good, and accept that—properly delineated—public forum doc-
trine will work well enough both to secure this fundamental right and
to address public concerns.
In fact, public forum should work better for the Second Amend-
ment than the First.  The concept of a forum is more theoretical in the
context of speech, and therefore more esoteric.  The Court has always
had to grapple with how to apply this doctrine in a metaphysical fo-
rum such as an internal mail system,360 or access to government
funds.361  These difficulties are exacerbated by newer technologies
such as webpages and internet communication.362  By contrast, in the
context of the right to bear arms, every forum is a literal forum, with
geographical boundaries, precise physical limits, and objectively veri-
fiable features.  This is an aspect of a traditional forum in First
Amendment cases,363 but would apply to every type of forum for Sec-
ond Amendment cases.  This makes public forum doctrine much easier
to apply to burdens on the right to bear arms.
B. Applying the Four Types of Public Forum to the Second
Amendment
The Supreme Court speaks of three types of public forum.  As bold
as this may sound, the Supreme Court is incorrect.  There are four
types of public forum.364  The Court has said there are three, but
courts provide differing lists: in one case the Supreme Court says the
358. See, e.g., POST, supra note 347, at 1797–1800; David S. Day, The End of the Public
Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 186 (1992).
359. Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,
86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2001).
360. E.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
361. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995).
362. Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1975, 1994–2002 (2011);
Strict Scrutiny, supra note 351, at 2141.
363. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
364. At least one other scholar shares my view on this. See Lidsky, supra note 362, at
1981–91.
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list is traditional, limited, and nonpublic,365 but many federal appeals
courts say the list is traditional, designated, and nonpublic.366
This improper enumeration has led scholars to say the Court cre-
ated “a complex maze of categories and subcategories” of forums
(a.k.a. “fora”).367  Properly enumerated, the four types of public forum
are: traditional, designated, limited, and nonpublic.  Each of these
four types is governed by different rules, and is even more useful for
properly respecting and upholding gun rights than they are for speech
rights.
1. Standard Framework for Traditional and Designated Public
Forums
The first two forum types result in the application of the same
standards of review.  They are the traditional public forum and the
designated public forum.  The only difference between the two is that
one exists by nature, and the other is created by the government.
There are certain public spaces to which citizens traditionally have
unfettered access.  There are certain other places that are owned by
the government, but in which the government can open the doors so
wide for public access that a person present at that location perceives
no material difference from a traditional forum pertaining to rights of
expression.
As just noted, there is some confusion whether there is a difference
between a designated forum versus a limited forum.  The difference is
a subtle one that exists more de facto than de jure.  In theory, anytime
the government opens a forum it could be limited in the sense that the
government is opening the space to the public for a reason, and so that
would allow for additional restrictions on either speech or arms.  This
Article distinguishes the two by saying that a governmentally opened
forum that has no manifest reason for restricting speech or gun rights
beyond the sort of uses seen in a traditional forum is a designated
forum that is unlimited, as opposed to a limited forum where there are
reasons for additional restrictions.
A traditional public forum is the “quintessential” forum.368  The
Supreme Court has recognized three traditional public fora: parks,369
streets,370 and sidewalks.371  These places are essentially always open
365. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
366. See, e.g., Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); Ridley v. Mass. Bay
Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2004).
367. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THE-
ORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 409[D] at 4–71 (2d ed. 1984).
368. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. 37).
369. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion).
370. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943).
371. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1983).
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to everyone.  Although most people do not go to public fora to engage
in speech, they enjoy broad liberty to express ideas.  “[B]y long tradi-
tion or by government fiat [this forum is] devoted to assembly and de-
bate.”372  Accordingly, government’s ability to restrict speech here is
“very limited.”373  Since traditional fora are defined with reference to
their historical uses, it is unlikely the Court will recognize any addi-
tions to its current list of three.374
A designated public forum is one opened by the government for
people to engage in speech, such as a fairground during the state fair
for public speeches or a community center opened for a town hall
meeting.  There must be clear indicia of government intent to create a
designated forum.375  And government may also eliminate the forum
at any time, closing it to the public regarding First Amendment activ-
ity.376  More precisely, this type of designated forum is an unlimited
designated forum, as opposed to the limited designated forum dis-
cussed below.  Although it does not enjoy broader protection than a
traditional forum, it is worth noting that, unlike in a traditional fo-
rum, many people attending a designated forum do so knowing that
public speech will be a prominent activity at that location (if not the
only activity).
The level of scrutiny that applies in either a traditional forum or a
designated forum is exactly what it would be if the speaker were on
private land.377  As discussed in Part V, strict scrutiny attends con-
tent-based restrictions;378 intermediate scrutiny applies to content-
neutral restrictions on speech pertaining to time, place, or manner;
and viewpoint discrimination is per se invalid.379
These principles can be applied to firearms.  Even supporters of the
right to bear arms admit that whether the Second Amendment covers
carrying handguns in public is not as easily answered as in the
372. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
373. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
374. See Lidsky, supra note 362, at 1983 n.36 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v.
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998)).
375. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802–03 (1985).
376. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
377. Id. (holding that when the government opens its lands to the public, “it is bound
by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum”).
378. Id. at 45 (holding that content-based discrimination must be “necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and . . . narrowly drawn to achieve that end”).
379. It is worth noting here that the Court has separately indicated this per se rule
applies specifically in the public-forum context. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Vis-
itors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the realm of private speech or
expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.”); Po-
lice Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (Government may not “grant
the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
wishing to express less favored or more controversial views”).
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home.380  “A man’s home is his castle.”  A citizen does not have com-
plete dominion over his surroundings once he leaves that castle to
venture amongst other people.  Sociability requires that people have
more regard for the concerns and predilections of others when volun-
tarily entering public places, so it becomes more difficult to draw the
line with regard to firearms.
At the same time, it makes perfect sense why the right extends to
public places.  Judge Richard Posner—an outspoken critic of recogniz-
ing the Second Amendment as an individual right381—acknowledges
that “knowing that many law-abiding citizens are walking the streets
armed may make criminals timid.”382  Nothing in the text or history of
the Second Amendment says anything to the contrary.
That fact notwithstanding, several inferior federal courts have not
taken the Second Amendment as seriously as they take the First
Amendment.  The Fourth Circuit went so far as to say it did not know
whether the Second Amendment applies at all outside the home,383
and the Second Circuit would not affirm that the right extends even to
a summer home.384  Denying that the Second Amendment applies
broadly—such as on private land in a summer home—is irreconcilable
with earnestly regarding the right to bear arms as a fundamental
right.
The Second Amendment certainly applies outside the home, in-
cluding public places.  In a traditional public forum or designated pub-
lic forum, heightened scrutiny always applies in one of its three forms.
Burdens on the core of the Second Amendment are subject to strict
scrutiny; burdens on the time, place, or manner are subject to inter-
mediate scrutiny; and an absolute ban on bearing any firearms in a
traditional or designated forum is categorically unconstitutional.
When you think of the sorts of public places where people would
seek to carry guns for lawful and well-intentioned reasons, most are
traditional forums.  One thinks of someone carrying a concealed pistol
when they are going for a walk in the park, or taking a stroll in the
neighborhood, or when walking down the street to buy something at
the corner store.  Many other places would be designated forums, such
as political rallies at community meeting sites.
380. See, e.g., Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d
sub nom. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
381. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27,
2008, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/defense-looseness, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/PSJ2-LES3.
382. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 937 (7th Cir. 2012).
383. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011).
384. See Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
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2. Additional Restrictions Permissible in Limited Public Forums
The Supreme Court recognized limited public fora in Widmar v.
Vincent.385  The Court later expanded upon this in Perry, where Jus-
tice Byron White discussed designated fora, but then added in a foot-
note, “A public forum may be created for a limited purpose,” specifying
as two examples that such limitations include which groups could ac-
cess the facility, or the subjects being discussed.386  Perhaps the defin-
ing case is Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.387  Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court held that the school’s stu-
dent activities fund was a limited public forum,388 and the college’s
policy disallowing funds to a religious newspaper was unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination.389
The Supreme Court has held that in a limited forum government
may impose additional restrictions consistent with keeping the forum
functioning in the manner for which people access it.  First, whatever
restrictions would be constitutional in a traditional forum are also al-
lowed in a limited forum.  Any additional restrictions must be “reason-
able in light of the purpose served by the forum,”390 so long as they are
viewpoint neutral.391  This test refined and updated the Court’s ear-
lier holding that the “crucial question” in content-neutral regulations
is “whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with
the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”392  If so,
then another theoretical construct through which to understand the
limited forum is that the rule remains intermediate scrutiny, but the
government has additional important interests when creating limited
fora, and so can employ additional restrictions as means to advance
those interests, so long as they are properly tailored.
Government can exclude a speaker from a limited forum whose
speech falls within the parameters of the forum’s limited purpose, but
only if the exclusion satisfies strict scrutiny.393  In doing so, courts
must carefully examine the exclusion to determine if what is actually
happening is a form of viewpoint discrimination, which the Constitu-
tion never permits.
385. 454 U.S. 263, 272 (1981).
386. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983).
387. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
388. Id. at 829–30.
389. Id. at 831.
390. Id. at 829 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985)).
391. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009); Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (citing U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
392. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
393. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); see also Mark
Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225, 1248–49 (1999) (discussing this standard).
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Applying the Second Amendment here is relatively straightfor-
ward, building upon the designated forum discussion above.  Loca-
tions such as libraries are limited forums, so additional restrictions
could be imposed (so long as the government can articulate a rationale
predicated upon the nature of a library), but there still could not be a
categorical rule that no citizen could ever have any type of firearm.
3. Reasonableness Test for Nonpublic Forums
Finally, there is the nonpublic forum.  A nonpublic forum is a gov-
ernment facility to which at least some private citizens have access
but “which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public com-
munication.”394  In other words, it is a government location or facility
that is not any of the three types of public forum already discussed.
Consequently, in a nonpublic forum, government may impose any
speech restriction so long as it is “reasonable and not an effort to sup-
press expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view.”395  Government has the ability to “preserve the property under
its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,”396 which im-
plicitly includes the ability to deny access to persons whose intended
activities do not pertain to that purpose.397  For example, the govern-
ment can deny access to an airport to anyone who is not engaging in
air travel.
The reasonableness standard is synonymous with rational-basis
review.  When you say a law is rationally (or reasonably) related to
promoting some legitimate public interest, you are simply asking if
the law is reasonable.  Rational-basis review “is not a license for
courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”398
The court cannot even consider whether the law actually advances the
purported interest; the inquiry is instead whether the legislature was
literally irrational in thinking the law would in any way advance any
interest.399
Rational-basis review allows for imperfect distinctions and even
clearly unequal treatment of similarly-situated persons, as it requires
only that the challenged law or action “advances legitimate legislative
goals in a rational fashion.”400  And rather than assessing whether the
law actually advances the purported public interest, a reviewing court
394. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
395. Id.
396. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178 (1983) (quoting Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966)).
397. Perry, 460 U.S. at 49.
398. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,
508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)).
399. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313 (1993); W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671–72 (1981).
400. Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981).
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merely asks whether the legislative body or government actor was
reasonable in believing the law would do so.401  Given how easy it is to
pass this minimal standard of review, essentially the only speech re-
strictions in a nonpublic forum that fail judicial review are instances
of viewpoint discrimination.402  Government regulatory power regard-
ing speech is at its apogee in a nonpublic forum.
Thus far the Court has clearly recognized only three types of non-
public forums: airports,403 public schools,404 and military facilities.405
But many other locations would fit this description, such as court-
rooms and legislative galleries.  The public is admitted on a space-
available basis to the Supreme Court and may also gain access to
watch debates in Congress, but have no constitutional right to speak
out in those places.
This then is the rule that would govern in what Heller ambiguously
referred to as sensitive government places.  While it would seem that
this is where the First/Second Amendment analogy breaks down,
since firearms can be barred from such places, this instead illustrates
the propriety of the rule.  As discussed in detail in Parts III & IV, the
Second Amendment secures a right for self-defense and a special right
against government tyranny.  For a nonpublic forum, private citizens
bearing arms can be disallowed because government assumes the obli-
gation of physically protecting the citizen.  Any visitor to a statehouse
or county courthouse knows they are protected by armed security (typ-
ically police officers), and in places such as the White House, U.S.
Capitol, or Supreme Court, the armed presence is so great that those
places are essentially fortresses.
The same is true in all three types of recognized nonpublic fora.
Military bases have military security, airports are protected by local
police and federal agents, and many schools have armed security, typi-
cally city police or county sheriff’s deputies.  By choosing to enter
those premises, the citizen temporary impairs his own right to person-
ally engage in self-defense, but the government is there to effectuate
that right.
All that leaves is the concern regarding tyranny.  But it is a self-
evident truth that the right to protect against oppressive government
does not mean you can carry weapons into government facilities.  It is
a right to defend your family and community against an advancing
tyrannical force.  If you are strolling into the government’s nonpublic
401. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315.
402. E.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001); Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993).
403. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 684–85 (1992).
404. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 50–51 (1983).
405. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
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buildings, then presumably you are not currently in a state of revolu-
tion against a tyrant.
Government can accommodate Second Amendment interests.  It
could provide gun-check stations at guard posts on the perimeter of
the government facility.  Or it could permit an individual to keep his
firearm in his vehicle in the parking lot outside the security perime-
ter.  Any restriction would be permitted in such a setting, unless it
was patently unreasonable.  To analogize to viewpoint discrimination,
it is likely that the only type of restriction that is per se unreasonable
is one that intends to leave citizens unprotected and defenseless—and
it is unlikely many such restrictions are on the books.
VII. CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that no series of Supreme Court decisions
will ever end the controversy over guns in America.406  Both sides of
this debate hold deep passions, and no data set or reasoned argument
is going to resolve such energetic, visceral disagreement.
But the sheer number of firearms and gun owners in America, liv-
ing under so many relevant laws, makes it imperative that the judici-
ary develop a system of judicial review to provide sufficiently broad
contours to the right to bear arms commensurate with that right’s fun-
damental nature, while simultaneously recognizing the significant
public interests that government must give effect to regarding public
spaces and especially sensitive locations.  The urgency of this need is
further accentuated by this Article’s earlier discussion of what types of
weapons other than firearms are within the orbit of the Second
Amendment.
Applying the various levels of scrutiny governing the Free Speech
Clause can address all these concerns on private land.  And if the pub-
lic forum doctrine governing free speech on public land and facilities is
engrafted into the Second Amendment, it provides the additional reg-
ulatory powers to fully satisfy pressing public needs without impair-
ing in the slightest citizens’ self-defense interests when going about
their daily lives.
Such a unified framework governing both the First Amendment
and the Second Amendment demonstrates the reality that there is no
hierarchy among the Constitution’s fundamental rights.  And it will
enable courts to take advantage of a doctrinal framework they have
been developing for almost a century involving speech, as judges seek
to give full effect to the right to bear arms, even during this nascent
stage of development of the emerging jurisprudence governing the
Second Amendment.
406. Cf. MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE
BATTLE OVER GUNS, passim (2007).
